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Graded Epistemology

English title Graded Epistemology
Applicant Logins Arturs
Number 186137
Funding scheme Ambizione
Research institution Philosophisches Seminar Universität Zürich
Institution of higher education University of Zurich - ZH
Main discipline Philosophy
Start/End 01.02.2020 - 31.01.2024
Approved amount 525'821.00
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Keywords (5)

justification; normativity; epistemology; belief; degrees

Lay Summary (French)

Lead
Aspect gradable de la justification (et de croyances, ainsi que de la confiance, de certaines émotions) pose un problème pour une grande partie des théories épistémologiques contemporaines. Le but premier de ce projet est de proposer une théorie des propriétés gradables en épistémologie. Il présente aussi des enjeux pour d'autres notions, tels que la responsabilité, la confirmation, ou encore le doute raisonnable.
Lay summary

Nous avons tous des croyances. C'est à dire, il y a de choses que nous croyons, ou prenons pour acquis. Nous comptons sur des choses que nous prenons pour acquis dans nos prises de décision. Certaines de nos croyances sont justifiés ou rationnelles. D'autres ne le sont pas. La croyance que la Terre est ronde est justifiée, tandis que la croyance de certains que les humains ne sont en fait jamais allés sur la Lune semble être injustifiée.

Ce projet a comme point de départ une observation curieuse que certaines de nos croyances semble être plus justifiées que d’autres et que cet aspect gradable de la justification (et de croyances, ainsi que de la confiance, de certaines émotions) pose un problème pour une grande partie des théories épistémologiques contemporaines.

Le but premier de ce projet est de proposer une théorie nouvelle et fondamentale de propriétés gradables en épistémologie. Le travail concernant cette question s’inspire de résultats récents en linguistique des adjectifs gradables et propose de réviser la façon dont on théorise la gradabilité concernant la justification et d’autres notions en épistémologie.

 

Le projet présente des nombreux enjeux qui dépassent les frontières de l’épistémologie analytique. Outre fournir une compréhension des notions dégradables jusqu'ici peu étudiées, ce projet promet d’apporter un nouveau point de vue aussi en philosophie pratique (Le blâme et la responsabilité ont-ils en degrés ? Si oui, comment les théoriser ?), et même hors la philosophie (à quel moment est-ce le doute est raisonnable dans les domaines juridiques ? Quels sont des degrés de responsabilité juridique / politique ? Comment comprendre la confirmation scientifique incrémentielle ?)

Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 30.08.2019

Responsible applicant and co-applicants

Employees

Publications

Publication
Graded epistemic justification
Hawthorne John, Logins Arturs (2021), Graded epistemic justification, in Philosophical Studies, 178(6), 1845-1858.
How to argue with a pragmatist
Logins Artūrs (2021), How to argue with a pragmatist, in Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 1-16.
Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation
LoginsArturs, Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

Collaboration

Group / person Country
Types of collaboration
Dr. Aleks Knoks, Individual and Collective Reasoning Group, University of Luxembourg Luxembourg (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
Prof. John Hawthorne, University of Southern California, philosophy United States of America (North America)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
Groupe de Recherche en Epistemologie (GRE) France (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Prof. Davide Fassio (Zhejiang University, School of Humanities) China (Asia)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
Thumos reasearch group, (Prof. Fabrice Teroni), University of Geneva Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Knowledge and Decision Project (Prof. Moritz Schulz research group in TU Dresden) Germany (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results

Scientific events

Active participation

Title Type of contribution Title of article or contribution Date Place Persons involved
College de France workshop on degrees in epistemology. Talk given at a conference Qu’est-ce que le « poids » des raisons si la justification n’admets pas de degrés ? 24.06.2021 Paris (online), France Logins Arturs;
ZEGRA (Zurich) - Dresden workshop on rationality Talk given at a conference In What Sense Is Belief Dual ? 17.06.2021 Zurich-Dresden (online), Germany Logins Arturs;
LangCo, Seminar Series in Analytic Philosophy 2020/2021, Lisbon, Portugal (online) Talk given at a conference Reasons in Deception 14.05.2021 Lisbon (online), Portugal Logins Arturs;
Seminarkolloquium Department of philosophy, University of Zurich, Switzerland, (online) Talk given at a conference The Paradox of Graded Justification. 21.04.2021 Zurich (online), Switzerland Logins Arturs;
Research Colloquium of Groupe de Recherche en Épistémologie de la chaire "Métaphysique et philosophie de la connaissance" (Collège de France), Collège de France Talk given at a conference The Paradox of Graded Justification. 27.11.2020 Paris (online), France Logins Arturs;
Research Colloquium in Epistemology and Metaethics, Department of philosophy, University of Zurich Talk given at a conference The Paradox of Graded Justification 18.11.2020 Zurich (online), Switzerland Logins Arturs;
Research Colloquium in Epistemology and Metaethics, Department of philosophy, University of Zurich, Switzerland Talk given at a conference Normative reasons : reasoning and explanation 11.03.2020 Zurich, Switzerland Logins Arturs;
PhilEAs conference cycle, University of Geneva, Switzerland Talk given at a conference Les raisons normatives 05.03.2020 Geneva, Switzerland Logins Arturs;


Self-organised

Title Date Place
ZEGRA (Zurich) - Dresden workshop on rationality, (online), 17-18 June, 2021 (organized in collaboration with Prof. Moritz Schulz) 17.06.2021 Zurich (online), Switzerland

Abstract

This project stems from the observation that a number of prominent views in contemporary epistemology (that is, theory of knowledge in general), in particular views about justification and belief, stand in apparent tension with the simple common-sense view that justification, belief, and potentially other states, can have degrees and that these degrees are connected with categorical justification and belief. It makes sense to think that one is more justified in believing that 2+2=4 than one is in believing that it is drizzling outside. And it makes sense to think that we believe some claims to higher degrees than we believe others. I am more confident that the Earth is round than I am that Shakhtar Donetsk will not win Champions League this year. However, a number of otherwise plausible proposals about justification and belief appear to stand in conflict with these common-sense assumptions. For instance, the view that epistemic justification just is a sort of permissibility, where permissibility doesn’t admit of degrees, enters into a straightforward conflict with the existence of degrees of justification. Similarly, the view that epistemic justification is to be understood in terms of a compliance with a fundamental norm of belief also appears to be in tension with the gradability of justification, since compliance is not something that can come in degrees.The main objective for the present project is to explore the possibility of maintaining both the common-sense assumptions about gradability and the prominent recent views about justification and belief. The key for achieving that aim is to develop a new, more refined understanding of gradability in epistemology. In more general terms, the overall aim of the present project is to tackle the big-picture question of how to think about gradability in epistemology.More specifically, I aim to defend two positive hypotheses about the gradability of justification and belief, according to which i) the problematic tensions arise because of an implicit understanding of gradability in terms of a threshold scale, and ii) an alternative model of gradability in terms of endpoint scales avoids these tensions and can explain the relevant graded properties.The expected results of the project are a new understanding of gradable properties in epistemology, in particular of gradable justification and belief, as well as a theoretical assessment of the further implications of this understanding, and a complete evaluation of some of the existing alternative proposals. The results of this project are expected to produce a significant impact in normative epistemology and in particular with respect to various substantive theories of justification, as well as with respect to meta-normative discussions in epistemology more generally. The project is in the tradition of contemporary (analytic) epistemology, and as such will rely on the standard tools of (analytic) philosophy.
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