Justification; Evidence; Knowledge; Phenomenal conception of evidence; Epistemology
Logins Arturs (2015), ON HAVING EVIDENCE: A REPLY TO NETA, in LOGOS & EPISTEME
, VI(3), 367-370.
Logins Arturs (2014), Epistemic Justification, Normative Guidance, and Knowledg, in Dutant J. Fassio D. and Meylan A. (ed.), University of Geneva, Genève, 169-185.
Logins Arturs (2014), The problem of massive deception for justification norms of action, in Acta Analytica
, 29(4), 457-468.
The topic of the present project is the question of epistemic justification. More specifically, it is the question of what exactly determines when it is appropriate for one to believe something. Why is it the case that a belief that results from a mere wish-full thinking, for example, is unjustified, where a belief based on a large amount of scientific data is justified? The aim of the project is to elaborate and to defend a view according to which a subject is justified to believe a claim when she has sufficient evidence in its favour. We will, first, consider and propose a solution to the problem of exact definition of evidence. And second, we will examine whether this kind of theory is better than rival theories. We will use the traditional philosophical methodology: conceptual analysis, deductive and inductive reasoning and appeal to linguistic uses of ordinary concepts, such as evidence and belief.