Restrictions; Consequentialism; Options; Value; Deontology; Agent-Neutral Reasons; Appropriate Responses; Agent-Relative Reasons; Associative Duties
Löschke Jörg (2021), Agent-Relative Reasons and Normative Force, in Philosophia
, 49(1), 359-372.
Betzler Monika, Löschke Jörg (2021), Collegial Relationships, in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
, 24(1), 213-229.
Löschke Jörg (2021), Reasons to act, reasons to require, and the two-level theory of moral explanation, in Philosophical Studies
, 178(1), 169-185.
Reuter Kevin, Löschke Jörg, Betzler Monika (2020), What is a colleague? The descriptive and normative dimension of a dual character concept, in Philosophical Psychology
, 33(7), 997-1017.
Löschke Jörg (2020), Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses, in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
, 50(4), 477-491.
LöschkeJörg (2020), Harmony and Intrinsic Value, in Journal of East-West Thought
, 10, 27-43.
(2020), The Value of Sacrifices, in van Ackeren Marcel, Archer Alfred (ed.), Routledge, London, 120-140.
Löschke Jörg (2019), Responding Appropriately to the Impersonal Good, in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
, 22(3), 701-714.
LöschkeJörg (2019), Filiale Pflichten, in Drerup Johannes (ed.), Metzler, Stuttgart/Weimar, 244-251.
Consequentialism and deontology remain the two most prominent approaches in normative ethics, and they are often taken to be incompatible. Several attempts have been made to reconcile the plausible ideas of both kinds of theories, in particular consequentialism’s value-first framework and deontology’s emphasis on agent-relative reasons, but they all face problems. This constitutes an important research gap, because a theory that convincingly explains agent-relative reasons within a value-first framework is yet to be developed. The proposed research project aims to develop the groundwork for such a theory. More specifically, it aims to develop a novel multi-level value-based non-consequentialism that explains agent-relative reasons (as well as moral requirements) in terms of appropriate value responses on different levels. The project promises important results not only for normative ethics, but also for other fields of practical philosophy such as questions about the relation between reasons and values, about the good and meaningful life, or about the ability of agents to shape the normative landscape.