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Irrationality

English title Irrationality
Applicant Meylan Anne
Number 157436
Funding scheme SNSF Professorships
Research institution Philosophisches Seminar Künste, Medien, Philosophie Universität Basel
Institution of higher education University of Zurich - ZH
Main discipline Philosophy
Start/End 01.09.2015 - 30.09.2021
Approved amount 927'896.00
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All Disciplines (3)

Discipline
Philosophy
Neurology, Psychiatry
Psychology

Keywords (8)

Delusions; Self-deception; Biases; Madness; Wishful thinking; Doxastic blameworthiness; Doxastic control; Reasons to believe

Lay Summary (French)

Lead
Les êtres humains sont parfois irrationnels dans ce qu’ils croient ou tiennent pour vrai. C’est un fait reconnu et les psychologues en ont fait la preuve de diverses manières.Il semble exister diverses formes d’irrationalité cognitive. Certaines formes sont pathologiques. C'est le cas, par exemple, des croyances que les personnes anorexiques entretiennent à propos de leur poids ou des croyances délirantes des schizophrènes. D’autres formes d’irrationalité cognitive sont plus communes. C’est le cas de l’auto duperie, c'est-à-dire, du processus grâce auquel nous nous trompons nous-mêmes de manière à ne pas considérer la réalité telle qu'elle nous apparaît (par exemple, lorsque nous refusons de croire que notre fils va redoubler son année scolaire). L’objectif de ce projet de recherche est d’examiner les éventuels points de convergence des formes pathologiques et non-pathologiques d’irrationalité cognitive.
Lay summary

 Les êtres humains sont parfois irrationnels dans ce qu’ils croient ou tiennent pour vrai. C’est un fait reconnu et les psychologues en ont fait la preuve de diverses manières. Il semble y avoir diverses formes d’irrationalité cognitive. Certaines formes sont pathologiques. C’est, par exemple, le cas de l’irrationalité qui caractérise la croyance du jeune homme anorexique ou des croyances délirantes des schizophrènes. D’autres formes d’irrationalité cognitive sont plus communes. C’est le cas de l’auto duperie, c'est-à-dire, du processus grâce auquel nous nous trompons nous-mêmes afin de ne pas considérer la réalité telle qu'elle nous apparaît. L'auto duperie, contrairement aux formes pathologiques d'irrationalité cognitive, n'est pas un phénomène rare. Qui ne connaît pas quelqu'un qui persiste à croire que son enfant est le plus doué de sa classe malgré ses mauvais résultats ou quelqu'un qui refuse de croire aux dangers du tabac, etc?

L’objectif général de ce projet de recherche est d’examiner les éventuels points de convergence des formes pathologiques et non-pathologiques d’irrationalité cognitive. Ces divers types d'irrationalité cognitive n'ont-ils vraiment rien en commun, comme leur catégorisation dans les domaines du "pathologique" et du "normal" pourrait laisser penser? Notre hypothèse initiale est qu'ils ont quelque chose en commun.

L'objectif plus spécifique de ce projet de recherche est d'améliorer la description philosophique existante de ce phénomène courant d'irrationalité cognitive qu'est l'auto duperie.

Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 23.07.2015

Responsible applicant and co-applicants

Employees

Publications

Publication
Believing Rationally Under the Influence
Sarzano Melanie (2020), Believing Rationally Under the Influence, University of Zurich, Zurich.
Doxastic Divergence and the Problem of Comparability. Pragmatism Defended Further
MeylanAnne (2020), Doxastic Divergence and the Problem of Comparability. Pragmatism Defended Further, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1.
Responsibility for Irrational Beliefs
van LoonMarie (2020), Responsibility for Irrational Beliefs, University of Zurich, Zurich.
Introduction. Self-Deception: New Angles
Meylan Anne (2019), Introduction. Self-Deception: New Angles, in Ethics Forum, 13(2), 4-10.
Le blâme pour les croyances irrationelles peut-il se passer d'agentivité?
van Loon Marie (2019), Le blâme pour les croyances irrationelles peut-il se passer d'agentivité?, in Klēsis - Revue Philosophique , 1.
Responsibility for self-deception
van Loon Marie (2018), Responsibility for self-deception, in Les ateliers de l'éthique, 13(2), 119-134.
Biais Cognitifs. Entrée Académique
van Loon Marie (2018), Biais Cognitifs. Entrée Académique, Encyclopedie de Philosophie en Ligne, Online.
The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation
Meylan Anne (2018), The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation, in Erkenntnis, 1-17.
Costly False Beliefs: waht self-deception and pragmatic encroachment can tell us about the rationality of beliefs
Sarzano Melanie (2018), Costly False Beliefs: waht self-deception and pragmatic encroachment can tell us about the rationality of beliefs, in Les ateliers de l'éthique, 13(2), 95-95.
Justification et rationalité des émotions
Meylan Anne (2018), Justification et rationalité des émotions, in Philosophiques, 45(2), 477-487.
L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaine
Meylan Anne (2018), L’évaluation de l’auto duperie : Butler, Clifford et la philosophie contemporaine, in Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’étranger, 143, 357-370.
Passing the Epistemic Buck
Meylan Anne, Fassio Davide (2018), Passing the Epistemic Buck, in McHugh Conor Way Jonathan Whiting Daniel (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 46-66.
Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems
Meylan Anne (2018), Virtue-Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge: Classical and New Problems, in Battaly Heather (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 317-329.
In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification
Meylan Anne (2017), In Support of the Knowledge-First Conception of the Normativity of Justification, in Carter Adam Gordon Emma Jarvis Benjamin (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 246-258.
Introduction
Meylan Anne, Dutant Julien, Fassio Davide (2017), Introduction, in Synthese, (5), 1427-1431.
Les intuitions : Rationalité et affectivité
Meylan Anne (2017), Les intuitions : Rationalité et affectivité, in Philosophiques, (1), 31-47.
L'Intéressant
Meylan Anne (2017), L'Intéressant, in Deonna Julien Tieffenbach Emma (ed.), Ithaque, Paris, 178-186.
The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility
Meylan Anne (2017), The Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility, in Theoria, (1), 4-28.
The Pluralism of Justification
Meylan Anne (2017), The Pluralism of Justification, in Coliva Annalisa, Pedersen Nikolaj (ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 129-142.
Connaissance. Entrée Grand Public
Sarzano Melanie (2016), Connaissance. Entrée Grand Public, L'encyclopedie philosophique en ligne, Online.
Biais Cognitifs. Entrée Grand Public
van LoonMarie (2016), Biais Cognitifs. Entrée Grand Public, Encyclopédie de Philosophie en Ligne, Online.
Les vices épistémiques de Sam: un homme de ressentiment, suffisent, bête et complaisant
van Loon Marie, Sarzano Melanie, Neeser Benjamin, Bonard Constant (2016), Les vices épistémiques de Sam: un homme de ressentiment, suffisent, bête et complaisant, in iPhilo, Special Issue for Kevin Mulligan(9), 6-20.
'Quelques problèmes de la Conception duale de la norme de l’action et de l’assertion. Une réponse à Jacques-Henri Vollet
van Loon Marie, Sarzano Melanie (2016), 'Quelques problèmes de la Conception duale de la norme de l’action et de l’assertion. Une réponse à Jacques-Henri Vollet, Collège de France, Paris.
Quelques problèmes de la Conception duale de la norme de l’action et de l’assertion. Une réponse à Jacques-Henri Vollet
van Loon Marie, Sarzano Melanie (2016), Quelques problèmes de la Conception duale de la norme de l’action et de l’assertion. Une réponse à Jacques-Henri Vollet, Collège de France, Paris.
Qu’est-ce que la justification?
Meylan Anne (2015), Qu’est-ce que la justification?, Vrin, Paris.
The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame
Meylan Anne (2015), The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame, in Journal of Philosophical Research, 149-203.
», Petit dictionnaire des valeurs
Meylan Anne, », Petit dictionnaire des valeurs, in Deonna Julien Tieffenbach Emma (ed.), Ithaque, Paris, 1.
Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief. Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection
MeylanAnne, Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief. Virtue Epistemology and the Temporal Objection, in Greco and Kelp John and Chris (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
L'empiètement pragmatique est-il pragmatiste?
SarzanoMelanie, L'empiètement pragmatique est-il pragmatiste?, in Klēsis Revue Philosophique.
Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance
MeylanAnne, Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance, in Brill Studies in Skepticism.
The Disvalue of Ignorance
MeylanAnne, The Disvalue of Ignorance, in Grazer Philosophische Studien.
The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought
MeylanAnne, The Normative Ground of the Evidential Ought, in McCain Kevin, Stapleford Scott (ed.), Routledge, New York, 1.

Collaboration

Group / person Country
Types of collaboration
Eidyn: The Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind and Normativity Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
GRIN: groupe de recherche interuniversitaire sur la normativité, Université de Montréal Canada (North America)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris, Prof. Pascal Engel France (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
The Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology Group at KU Leuven Netherlands (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Centre de sciences cognitives, Université de Neuchâtel Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Industry/business/other use-inspired collaboration
Cogito Group, University of Glasgow Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
- Exchange of personnel
Swiss Doctoral School for Affective Science, Swiss Center for Affective Science Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
GRE: Groupe de recherche en épistémologie, Collège de France France (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Publication
Philosophy department, University of Toronto, Prof. Jennifer Nagel Canada (North America)
- Exchange of personnel
Philosophisches Seminar, Universität München Germany (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Exchange of personnel
Philosophy department, University of Sheffield, Prof. Jennifer Saul Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Philosophy Department, Harvard University, Prof. Susanna Rinard United States of America (North America)
- Exchange of personnel
PERFECT: European Project directed by prof. Lisa Bortolotti, Birmingham Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Bern Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Exchange of personnel
Philosophy Department, UCSD, Prof. Dana Nelkin United States of America (North America)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results

Scientific events

Active participation

Title Type of contribution Title of article or contribution Date Place Persons involved
The Unity of Normativity Conference Talk given at a conference In Defense of Moderate Pragmatism 24.09.2020 Online event (hosted by the University of Vienna), Austria Sarzano Melanie;
European Congress of Analytic Philosophy (ECAP10) Talk given at a conference In Defense of Moderate Pragmatism and the Risks-Costs Principle 24.08.2020 Online event (hosted by Utrecht University), Netherlands Sarzano Melanie;
Symposium on Lisa Bortolotti's Book: Epistemic Innocence Talk given at a conference Epistemic Innocence and how to weigh irrationality 01.06.2020 Online/Birmingham, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Meylan Anne;
Colloquium Individual talk Diachronic evidentialism and the norms of inquiry 13.05.2020 Online event (University of Zurich), Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Theoretische Philosophie Kolloquium (Online) Individual talk What Excuses Do 29.04.2020 University of Zurich, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Reasons, Action, and Mind, Talks Series Individual talk Ignorance and Its Disvalue 06.02.2020 Toronto, Canada Meylan Anne;
Rationality: What’s Good, What’s Bad Talk given at a conference Give them an inch, they’ll take a mile 05.12.2019 University of Zurich, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Rationality: What’s Good, What’s Bad Talk given at a conference Are delusions responsive to reasons? 05.12.2019 University of Zurich, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Oxford Graduate Conference Talk given at a conference How to Weight the True against the Good 16.11.2019 Oxford, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Meylan Anne;
Ringsvorlesungen, Universität Luzern Individual talk Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability Pragmatism defended further 05.11.2019 Lucerne, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Phileas cycle de conférences, Université de Genève Individual talk Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability Pragmatism defended further 31.10.2019 Genève, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Theoretische Philosophie Kolloquium Individual talk Doxastic Responsibility and Cognitive Irrationality 04.10.2019 University of Zurich, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Conference: The Social Epistemology of John Greco Talk given at a conference Ignoring Ignorance 06.05.2019 Paris, France Meylan Anne;
Notre Dame/Northwestern Annual Epistemology Conference Talk given at a conference Self-deception and pragmatic encroachment: a dilemma 27.04.2019 University of Notre Dame, United States of America Sarzano Melanie;
New Orleans Graduate Conference in Philosophy Talk given at a conference Self-deception and pragmatic encroachment: a dilemma 05.04.2019 Tulane University, United States of America Sarzano Melanie;
Departmental Seminar, University of Stirling Individual talk Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further 21.03.2019 Stirling, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Meylan Anne;
Seminarkolloquium, University of Munich Individual talk Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further 06.02.2019 Münich, Germany Meylan Anne;
Graduate Forum Individual talk Suspending belief for practical reasons: a rational thing to do? 01.02.2019 University of Toronto, Canada Sarzano Melanie;
Third Lake Geneva Conference Talk given at a conference Belief Evaluation: Weighing the Justified Against the Advantageous 17.12.2018 Neuchâtel, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
New Perspectives on Mental State Attributions Poster Introduction to Prof. J. Roessler 10.12.2018 University of Toronto, Canada Sarzano Melanie;
Seminarkolloquium, University of Zurich Individual talk Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes, and the Practical Stance 28.11.2018 Zurich, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Conference: Norms and Reasons Talk given at a conference Belief Evaluation: Weighing the Justified Against the Advantageous 01.11.2018 Zurich, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
13th Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy Conference Talk given at a conference ‘Making the Lie Stick: Possessing Evidence in Self-Deception’ 04.09.2018 University of Eastern Piedmont, Novara, Italy van Loon Marie;
European Epistemology Network Conference Talk given at a conference ‘Responsibility for Biased Belief’ 28.06.2018 Vrij Universiteit, Amsterdam, Netherlands van Loon Marie;
European Epistemology Network Conference Talk given at a conference Influence on Belief: Pragmatic yet Rational 28.06.2018 Vrij Universiteit, Netherlands Sarzano Melanie;
Irrationality in Basel Talk given at a conference 'Responsibility for biased beliefs' 05.06.2018 University of Basel , Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Irrationality in Basel Talk given at a conference Evidentialism, Adaptive Cognition and Cognitive Irrationality 05.06.2018 University of Basel, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Cognitive Irrationality Workshop Talk given at a conference What Should I Believe? Just Compare 05.06.2018 University of Basel, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Theoretical Philosophy Chair Retreat Workshop - University of Basel Talk given at a conference On the Rational Influences of Practical Influences on Belief 25.05.2018 Castasegna, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Theoretical Philosophy Chair Retreat Workshop – University of Basel Talk given at a conference ‘Cognitive Bias as Omission’ 25.05.2018 Castasegna, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Seminar Series, institute of Philosophy, University of Glasgow Individual talk What Should I Believe? Just Compare 03.05.2018 Glasgow, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Meylan Anne;
Forschungskolloquium Prof. Halbig, Ethik Zentrum Individual talk What should I believe? Just Compare 26.04.2018 University of Zurich, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Winter GRE workshop Talk given at a conference Croyances Coûteuses 02.03.2018 Collège de France, France Sarzano Melanie;
Winter GRÉ Workshop Talk given at a conference ‘La responsabilité pour la duperie de soi’ 02.03.2018 Collège de France, Paris, France van Loon Marie;
Seminar Series of the Thumos Group Individual talk Basing Doxastic Responsibility on Epistemic Reasons 01.03.2018 University of Geneva, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Epistemic and Practical Rationality: Differences, Relations and Overlaps Talk given at a conference ‘The mechanisms of self-deception: reasons-responsiveness and individuation’ 23.02.2018 University of Fribourg, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Epistemic and Practical Rationality: Differences, Relations and Overlaps Talk given at a conference What Should I Believe? Just Compare 22.02.2018 University of Fribourg, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Epistemic and Practical Rationality: Differences, Relations and Overlaps Talk given at a conference Costly False Beliefs 22.02.2018 Université de Fribourg, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Colloque informel de recherche, Institut de philosophie, Université de Neuchâtel Individual talk La connaissance est-elle passive? 19.12.2017 University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Talk Series of SWIP Switzerland Individual talk Consequential Conception of Doxastic Responsibility 22.11.2017 University of Bern, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Theoretical Philosophy Chair Team meeting Individual talk “The Reasons-Responsiveness of Self-deception” 01.11.2017 University of Basel, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Self-Deception: What it is and What it is Worth Talk given at a conference ‘The Reasons-Responsiveness of Self-Deception’ 25.10.2017 University of Basel, Switzerland van Loon Marie;
Cycle de conférences de la société bâloise de philosophie (à l'occasion de l'assemblée annuelle de la société suisse de philosophie) Individual talk Varieties of Irrationality 23.09.2017 Bâle, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
ECAP 9: European Conference for Analytic Philosophy Talk given at a conference Responsibility and the Basing Relation 24.08.2017 Münich, Germany Meylan Anne;
Ethics of Mind: Responsibility, Normativity, and Rationality Talk given at a conference Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation 01.08.2017 Erlangen, Germany Meylan Anne;
The Third Saar-Lux Joint Conference on Reasons and Rationality Talk given at a conference Virtue Epistemology and the Metaphysical Objection 07.07.2017 Saarbrücken, Germany Meylan Anne;
Responsibility for Attitudes Workshop Talk given at a conference “Comments on ‘The Grounds of Responsibility for Attitudes’ by Maria Alvarez” 26.06.2017 University of Southampton, Southampton, Great Britain and Northern Ireland van Loon Marie;
Retraite des Philosophischen Seminars der Universität Basel Talk given at a conference How to circumvent Gendler’s “sad conclusion” about stereotypes 17.06.2017 Castasegna, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Philosophy Retreat Talk given at a conference Epistemological Vices? 16.06.2017 Castasegna, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie; Meylan Anne;
6th Wiener Forum für Analytische Philosophie Graduate Conference Talk given at a conference ‘Naivety and Skepticism: Two Faces of the Same Coin’ 07.06.2017 University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria van Loon Marie; Sarzano Melanie;
Negative Emotions (Thumos Workshop) Talk given at a conference A response to "Emotion Cultivation: Implications for Agency and Virtue" by C. Kurth 30.05.2017 University of Geneva, CISA, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Workshop of the groupe de recherche en épistémologie (GRE) Individual talk ‘Naiveté et Scepticisme: deux revers d’une même médaille’ 23.05.2017 Collège de France, Paris , France van Loon Marie; Sarzano Melanie;
Ringvorlesung der Universität Zürich: Emotionen Individual talk Why shouldn’t we be emotional after all? Emotions and Rationality 27.03.2017 Zurich, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Workshop of the groupe de recherche en épistémologie (GRE) Individual talk “Is the Suppression of our Stereotypes Self-Deceptive?” 14.03.2017 Paris, France Meylan Anne;
Forschungskolloquium Philosophisches Seminar der Universität Bonn Talk given at a conference Can beliefs be apt? 20.02.2017 Bonn, Germany Meylan Anne;
Teamtreffen Individual talk Varieties of Irrationality and Varieties of Self-Deception: Towards a New Account of Self-Deception 21.12.2016 University of Basel, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Knowledge-First Epistemology Conference Talk given at a conference Virtue Epistemology and the Metaphysical Objection 07.12.2016 Leuven, Belgium Sarzano Melanie; van Loon Marie; Meylan Anne;
Quod Libeta: Research Seminar of the Philosophy Department, University of Geneva Individual talk Cognitive Normativity: Metaphysical Issues 24.11.2016 Genève, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
séminaire de recherche du GRIN Individual talk Cognitive Normativity: Metaphysical Issues 11.11.2016 Montréal, Canada Meylan Anne;
"New Perspectives on Self-Deception: Nouvelles Perspectives sur la Duperie de Soi" Talk given at a conference Varieties of Irrationality: the Case of Self-Deception 10.11.2016 Université de Montréal, Canada Sarzano Melanie;
"New Perspectives on Self-Deception: Nouvelles Perspectives sur la Duperie de Soi" Talk given at a conference Responsibility for Self-Deception 10.11.2016 Université de Montréal, Canada van Loon Marie;
Self-Deception: What it is and What it is Worth Talk given at a conference Costly False Beliefs 25.10.2016 University of Basel, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie;
Interdisciplinary Tagung: Selbsttäuschung. eine Herausforderung für Philosophie und Psychoanalys Talk given at a conference Is Self-Deception Irrational? 15.09.2016 Bâle, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Colloque de Recherche Individual talk Is There Something Rotten in the Realm of Knowledge? 12.04.2016 Université de Neuchâtel, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie; van Loon Marie;
Thumos Research Seminar Individual talk Understanding the Incompatibility of Rationality and Irrationality 10.03.2016 CISA, University of Geneva, Switzerland van Loon Marie; Sarzano Melanie;
Research Seminar of the Philosophy Department, University of Munich Individual talk Doxastic Responsibility and the Basing Relation 11.11.2015 Münich, Germany Meylan Anne;
Forschung Kolloquium Individual talk What is the Relation Between Rationality and Irrationality? 28.10.2015 University of Basel, Switzerland Sarzano Melanie; van Loon Marie;
La connaissance et ses raisons. Perspectives épistémologiques contemporaines Talk given at a conference La normativité de la justification 15.09.2015 Paris, France Meylan Anne;
La connaissance et ses raisons. Perspectives épistémologiques contemporaines. Poster 'Quelques problèmes de la Conception duale de la norme de l’action et de l’assertion. Une réponse à Jacques-Henri Vollet 15.09.2015 Collège de France, Switzerland van Loon Marie; Sarzano Melanie;


Self-organised

Title Date Place
"Epistemic Anxiety, Adaptive Cognition, and Obsessive-compulsive disorder" by Juliette Vazard (University of Geneva, Institut Jean Nicod) 16.05.2018 University of Basel, Switzerland
“Emotions as Justifiers” by Andreas Szigeti (Linköping University, Lund University) 11.04.2018 University of Basel, Switzerland
Money is Power 13.12.2017 University of Basel, Switzerland
Self-Deception: what it is and what it is worth 25.10.2017 University of Basel, Switzerland
Self-Deception: What it is and What it is Worth 25.10.2017 University of Basel, Switzerland
"The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons", with Veli Mitova and Davide Fassio 14.06.2017 University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
Beliefs that Feel Good 16.12.2015 University of Basel, Switzerland
"Delusion and Acceptance" (Richard Dub) 11.12.2015 University of Basel, Switzerland
"Race, Stereotypes, Crime and the Purported Rationality of Stereotyping" (Kathy Puddifoot) 20.11.2015 University of Basel, Switzerland
"Self-Deception" (Federico Lauria) 06.11.2015 University of Basel, Switzerland

Knowledge transfer events

Active participation

Title Type of contribution Date Place Persons involved
Fake News, DAS Philosophie + Management, Universität Luzern Talk 17.05.2019 Luzern, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
SWIP Switzerland Conference Talk 23.11.2018 Bern, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Cycle de conférences de la société bâloise de philosophie (à l'occasion de l'assemblée annuelle de la société suisse de philosophie) Talk 23.09.2017 Bâle, Switzerland Meylan Anne;
Ringvorlesung der Universität Zürich: Emotionen Talk 27.03.2017 Zurich, Switzerland Meylan Anne;


Communication with the public

Communication Title Media Place Year
Talks/events/exhibitions Tag der Lehre: Abstrakte Begriffe: Schwieriges greifbar machen" German-speaking Switzerland 2019
Media relations: print media, online media Biais cognitifs (entrée grand public) Encyclopédie Philosophique en ligne Western Switzerland International 2016
Media relations: print media, online media Connaissance (entrée grand public) Encyclopédie Philosophique en ligne International Western Switzerland 2016
Talks/events/exhibitions Famille et carrière académique Western Switzerland German-speaking Switzerland 2016
Print (books, brochures, leaflets) Les vices épistémiques de Sam: un homme de ressentiment, suffisent, bête et complaisant Western Switzerland 2016
Media relations: print media, online media Les Petits Penseurs (experte pour la rubrique) Campus Western Switzerland 2015
Media relations: print media, online media L'ignorance est parfois coupable L'Hebdo Western Switzerland 2015

Awards

Title Year
Swiss National Science Foundation Doc. Mobility Fellowship Title of the project: “Beliefs Under the Influence”, University of Toronto, mentored by Prof. J. Nagel 2018
Swiss National Science Foundation Doc. Mobility Fellowship Title of the project: “Irrational, Yet Responsible”, Harvard University, mentored by Prof. Susanna Rinard 2017

Associated projects

Number Title Start Funding scheme
139004 The Normative Mind 01.01.2013 SNSF Professorships
170456 The Nature and Value of Efforts 01.03.2017 SNSF Professorships
181672 Believing Under the Influence 01.09.2018 Doc.Mobility
140404 Epistemic Emotions: Nature and Role 01.06.2013 Project funding (Div. I-III)
139037 Biosemantik und Normativer Pragmatismus: Auf dem Weg zu einem einheitlichen Bild des menschlichen Geistes in der natürlichen Welt 01.05.2012 SNSF Professorships
175465 Self-deception: what it is and what it is worth 01.10.2017 Scientific Conferences
144403 Analyses de la rationalité en termes de connaissance 01.10.2012 Project funding (Div. I-III)
189259 Suspension of judgement: its nature and its norms 01.09.2020 Project funding (Div. I-III)

Abstract

Certain beliefs or judgements are indisputably irrational. When a victim of the Capgras delusion thinks that her husband has been replaced by an impostor, her mental state is definitely irrational. But irrationality is not confined to mental illness. Self-deception, wishful thinking, and denial are widespread, non-pathological cognitive phenomena that are also irrational. People in perfect mental health deceive themselves about their chances of winning the lottery, the intellectual talents of their kids, the fidelity of their husbands/wives, the probability that they receive a salary increase, etc. In short, mentally healthy people hold irrational beliefs in diverse kinds of circumstance. Do these various irrational beliefs have something in common? Is there anything that makes them all irrational? As its name suggests, the general purpose of the project “Irrationality” is to answer these questions and to offer, thereby, a philosophical account of cognitive irrationality.
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