Publication

Back to overview Show all

Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
Volume (Issue) 87(2)
Page(s) 349 - 369
Title of proceedings Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales
DOI 10.2143/rtpm.87.2.3289008

Open Access

URL https://poj.peeters-leuven.be/content.php?id=3289008&url=article
Type of Open Access Green OA Embargo (Freely available via Repository after an embargo)

Abstract

Hervaeus Natalis distinguishes two types of items that can have esse obiective in the intellect: objects of acts of intellection (man, this cat, etc.) and properties unapprehended by these acts, or background properties (being a species, being a particular, etc.), that are beings of reason. Yet, his conception of the esse obiective of objects evolved. First, he had a neutral conception of esse obiective: items presenting themselves to the intellect are cognized, transparently, without being altered in the process. Later, he developed an ontologically committing conception of the objective being of objects: items presenting themselves to the intellect take on rational being (esse rationis) as such. This evolution transpires because Hervaeus introduces intentional relations as what makes the cognized item be objectively in the intellect and includes them within the class of background properties (being of reason). Both these conceptions manage to account for our access to extra-mental things.
-