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Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Original article (peer-reviewed)
Author Logins Artūrs,
Project Justification, Lotteries, and Permissibility
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Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal Filosofia Unisinos
Volume (Issue) 17(3)
Page(s) 302 - 307
Title of proceedings Filosofia Unisinos
DOI 10.4013/fsu.2016.173.06

Open Access


According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about evidence