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Seeing-In as Aspect Perception

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Contribution to book (peer-reviewed)
Publication date 2016
Author Dorsch Fabian,
Project The Normative Mind
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Contribution to book (peer-reviewed)

Book Seeing Something in Something: Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation
Editor , Mras Gabriele; , Kemp Gary
Publisher Routledge, London
Page(s) 205 - 238
ISBN 9781138123465
Title of proceedings Seeing Something in Something: Wollheim, Wittgenstein, and Pictorial Representation

Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that seeing-in, the central element of pictorial experience, is a form of aspect perception. The argument thus connects Wollheim’s main contribution to the philosophy of depiction with one of the central themes in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology. This *Aspect View* of pictorial experience that I would like to put forward is designed to be a direct competitor to the *Experienced Resemblance View* and the *Imagination View*, and to improve on both of them by incorporating some important elements of either. More specifically, the Aspect View claims that seeing-in involves the imperfect illusion of the picture’s surface as possessing the aspect of having the visual appearance of a three-dimensional arrangement of objects (i.e. the depicted scene). And, as part of this aspect perception, we both experience the picture’s surface as resembling the depicted scene in two-dimensional shape and have a non-perceptual awareness of the depth and volume of that scene which is similar to, but not quite like imagining.
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