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Agent-Relative Reasons as Second-Order Value Responses

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Original article (peer-reviewed)
Author Löschke Jörg,
Project Value-Based Non-Consequentialism
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Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume (Issue) 50(4)
Page(s) 477 - 491
Title of proceedings Canadian Journal of Philosophy
DOI 10.1017/can.2020.3

Open Access

Type of Open Access Green OA Embargo (Freely available via Repository after an embargo)


Abstract: Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism.