Publication

Back to overview

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Original article (peer-reviewed)
Author Stuart Michael T.,
Project Imagination in Science: What is it, how do we learn from it, and how can we improve it?
Show all

Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Title of proceedings Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
DOI 10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.03.005

Abstract

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn’t been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton’s fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.
-