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Review article (non peer-reviewed)

Journal SSRN Electronic Journal
Page(s) 1 - 31
Title of proceedings SSRN Electronic Journal
DOI 10.2139/ssrn.2925317

Open Access

Type of Open Access Publisher (Gold Open Access)


By voluntarily abandoning exchange rates and transferring control over monetary matters to a supranational central bank, Eurozone states have surrendered autonomy over some of the key elements of macroeconomic policy. Monetary union has had a crucial impact on how states can provide government functions, including some central to the realisation of economic justice. This article advances a theory of fairness and risk-sharing by developing principled answers to two basic questions: First, what do members of monetary unions owe one another in terms of socio-economic support? Second, what institutional architecture can best instantiate these normative requirements? After rejecting a number of influential conceptions of the normative requirements in monetary unions, this article formulates desiderata that a more convincing account will need to satisfy and presents an alternative moral outlook of how we should approach the moral basis of supranational monetary governance, focusing on background justice and equitable risk sharing. I then present some institutional proposals consistent with these more adequate moral foundations.