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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Original article (peer-reviewed)
Publication date 2009
Author Engel Pascal,
Project Perception, autorisation épistémique et connaissance a priori
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Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal Philosophical Explorations
Volume (Issue) 12(2)
Page(s) 205 - 219
Title of proceedings Philosophical Explorations
DOI 10.1080/13869790902838522


This article discusses the arguments against associating epistemic responsibility with the ordinary notion of agency. I examine the various 'Kantian' views which lead to a distinctive conception of epistemic agency and epistemic responsibility. I try to explain why we can be held responsible for our beliefs in the sense of obeying norms which regulate them without being epistemic agents. © 2009 Taylor & Francis.