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How to Undercut Radical Skepticism

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Original article (peer-reviewed)
Author Echeverri Santiago,
Project Sensing as Activity: Its Impact on the Structure of Perceptual and Emotional Experience
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Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal Philosophical Studies
Volume (Issue) 174(5)
Page(s) 1299 - 1321
Title of proceedings Philosophical Studies
DOI 10.1007/s11098-016-0761-9

Abstract

Radical skepticism relies on the hypothesis that one could be completely cut off from the external world. In this paper, I argue that this hypothesis can be rationally motivated by means of a conceivability argument. Subsequently, I submit that this conceivability argument does not furnish a good reason to believe that one could be completely cut off from the external world. To this end, I show that we cannot adequately conceive scenarios that verify the radical skeptical hypothesis. Attempts to do so fall prey to one or another of three pitfalls: they end up incomplete, reveal a deep contradiction or recreate a non-skeptical hypothesis. I use these results to improve upon Pritchard’s (2012, 2016) recent attempt at undercutting radical skepticism.
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