Publication

Journal	Grazer Philosophische Studien
Volume (Issue)	vol. 87
Page(s)	75
Title of proceedings	Grazer Philosophische Studien

In recent epistemological literature, epistemic entitlement is understood as a personal epistemic status that does not require elaborate justi! catory activity on behalf of the entitled individual. It is nevertheless internalist in a weaker sense, since it is said to be grounded in perceptual experiences. It seems, however, that the conditions under which an epistemic right holds should, like in cases of most other rights, be publicly observable, because they have implications for the ways others are required to treat the entitled individual. " erefore I suggest an alternative to the weakly internalist conception of epistemic entitlement as based on mental episodes. I show how we can construe epistemic rights as being based on external conditions that are publicly observable. " is social externalist approach is then defended against internalist and externalist challenges.