Publication

Book	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory
Editor	, Michaelian Kourken; , Debus Dorothea; , Perrin Denis
Publisher	Routledge, New York
Page(s)	329 - 345
ISBN	1138065609
Title of proceedings	New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory

According to an important family of approaches, memory seemings justify propositional memory judgements. Yet, these approaches lead to insurmountable problems. As a result, many contemporary accounts of propositional memory dispense with these seemings altogether. Is the idea that memory seemings play a key role in propositional memory really the result of bad theorizing? My aim is to shed light on this issue. I start by contrasting episodic with propositional memory: episodic memory preserves acquaintance, whereas propositional memory preserves thought contents. Next, I draw attention to the contrast between propositional memory contents and propositional memory as an attitude. Memory contents satisfy a past awareness and a causal constraints; the attitude of remembering explains why we are inclined to endorse these contents. This distinction leads me to explore the attitude of remembering, and I adopt an account of this attitude in terms of feelings of familiarity. I then revisit the claim that propositional memory judgements are justified by memory seemings. In so doing, I contend that the attitude of remembering plays an exclusively explanatory role and does not contribute to the epistemology of propositional memory judgements. I conclude by drawing a general lesson regarding the respective roles of attitudes and contents.