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Topological enslavement in evolutionary games on correlated multiplex networks

Type of publication Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform Original article (peer-reviewed)
Author Kleineberg Kaj-Kolja, Helbing Dirk,
Project The Anatomy of Systemic Financial Risk: Combining Ethical, Political and Economic Dimensions for Public Policy
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Original article (peer-reviewed)

Journal New Journal of Physics
Volume (Issue) 20(5)
Page(s) 053030 - 053030
Title of proceedings New Journal of Physics
DOI 10.1088/1367-2630/aac155

Open Access

Type of Open Access Publisher (Gold Open Access)


Governments and enterprises strongly rely on incentives to generate favorable outcomes from socialand strategic interactions between individuals. The incentives are usually modeled by payoffs inevolutionary games, such as the prisoners dilemma or the harmony game, with imitation dynamics.Adjusting the incentives by changing the payoff parameters can favor cooperation, as found in theharmony game, over defection, which prevails in the prisoner’s dilemma. Here, we show that this isnot always the case if individuals engage in strategic interactions in multiple domains. In particular, weinvestigate evolutionary games on multiplex networks where individuals obtain an aggregate payoff.We explicitly control the strength of degree correlations between nodes in the different layers of themultiplex. Wefind that if the multiplex is composed of many layers and degree correlations are strong,the topology of the system enslaves the dynamics and thefinal outcome, cooperation or defection,becomes independent of the payoff parameters. The fate of the system is then determined by the initialconditions.