Project

Discipline

Knowledge; Legal Responsibility; Bias; Theory of Mind; Mens Rea; Intentionality; Mental State Ascription

Lead
Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit setzt zwei Elemente voraus: die Verwirklichung einer strafbaren Handlung (objektiver Tatbestand) und den Vorsatz (subjektiver Tatbestand). Das Projekt Guilty Minds erforscht systematische Verzerrungen (biases) in der Zuschreibung des Vorsatzes durch Laienrichter (USA, England) und professionelle Richter (Schweiz, Deutschland, Frankreich).
Lay summary
Die relevanten Geisteszustände werden zunächst aus der Perspektive der Philosophie des Geistes und den Rechtsgrundlagen der fünf Länder analysiert. In Phase II werden auf der Basis von Erkenntnissen der Moralpsychologie Verzerrung in der Vorsatzzuschreibung empirisch erforscht. Phase III konzentriert sich auf Strategien die Verzerrungen zu beheben, welche ebenfalls experimentell getestet werden. In Phase IV werden länderspezifische Vorschläge unterbreitet, um systematische Verzerrungen in strafrechtlichen Entscheidungen zu beheben.  Das Projekt vereint Methoden und Erkenntnisse der Philosophie des Geistes, der Moral- und Sozialpsychologie, sowie der Rechtswissenschaften um das Strafrecht in der Alltagspraxis gerechter zu gestalten.

Direct link to Lay Summary

Last update: 06.12.2018

Active participation

Self-organised

READING GUILTY MINDSA systematic inquiry into biases afflicting mens rea ascriptions Theory of mind is the capacity to ascribe mental states - knowledge, beliefs, intentions - to others and ourselves. This capacity is essential for our ability to explain, predict and evaluate behaviour. Just as for moral judgment, theory of mind is of key importance for the assessment of legal responsibility. An individual is legally responsible for a crime if she (i) causally brought about a harmful outcome (actus reus) and (ii) acted with a ‘guilty mind’ (mens rea). Four mens reas are particularly prominent in most systems of criminal law - intentionality, knowledge, recklessness and negligence - and they engender different degrees of culpability. In few other contexts are mental state ascriptions of similar consequence as in criminal jurisprudence, and so it stands to reason to ensure that our practices of mens rea attribution are reliable and lead to just verdicts. The project aims to systematically investigate sources of pervasive bias in the ascription of legally inculpating states of mind, and to devises strategies that help alleviate such biases. It is divided into four parts. Part I establishes the project’s three-fold foundations: It elucidates (a) the notions of criminal responsibility and mens rea from the perspective of philosophy and legal theory, and explores (b) the legal status quo in the criminal law of Switzerland, France, Germany, the UK and the US. More particularly, it surveys which mental states are of importance for the ascription of legal responsibility, and how they are defined in the different systems. The final stage of Part I turns (c) to the empirical literature on relevant biases in mental state ascription and the assessment of responsibility, drawing particularly on recent moral psychology. Parts II and III, which are dedicated to empirical work, jointly constitute the centrepiece of the project. Part II investigates experimentally whether the attribution of mental states relevant for criminal jurisprudence is afflicted by pervasive biases. Part III assesses empirically what types of measures help alleviate biases in mens rea ascriptions. The experiments will work with different sample populations - laypeople and legal experts - since the targeted countries have different systems and procedures. Whereas in Switzerland, for instance, criminal trials are decided by professional judges, Anglophone countries such as the UK and the US have a juror system. Part IV will evaluate the findings and advance concrete recommendations of how criminal jurisprudence could be improved so as to guarantee the presumption of innocence, as well as fair and equal trial conditions for all. The project breaks new ground in several respects: Though there is a considerable number of empirical studies concerning all-things considered judgments invoking variables such as blame and culpability, little work has been done on the attribution of mens rea, a core component of blame and culpability. What is more, the experiments will target both laypeople and legal professionals, whose capacity of mens rea ascription has to date received next to no attention. Finally, the three comparative dimensions of the project - lay jury system v. professional judge system; the different legal codes of Switzerland, France, Germany, the UK and the US; uninitiated subjects v. legal experts - will provide comprehensive insight from which precise, system-specific lessons can be drawn. The project output will consist in publications of the empirical findings and theoretical implications in top-tier academic journals, as well as a detailed final report recommending concrete improvements in the criminal trial procedure for the targeted countries.