Substance; Change; Metaphysics; Philosophy of science; Time; Grounding; Fundamentality
Grandjean Vincent, Pascucci Matteo (2020), The Machine Scenario: A Computational Perspective on Alternative Representations of Indeterminism, in Minds and Machines
Correia Fabrice, Rosenkranz Sven (2020), Temporal existence and temporal location, in Philosophical Studies
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Correia Fabrice, Rosenkranz Sven (2020), On the relation between modality and tense, in Inquiry
, 63(6), 586-604.
Correia Fabrice, Rosenkranz Sven (2020), The Formalities of Temporaryism without Presentness, in Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
, 61(2), 181-202.
Calosi Claudio (2020), An Elegant Universe, in Synthese
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CorreiaFabrice (2020), Granularity, in Raven M. (ed.), Routledge, New York, 228.
CorreiaFabrice (2020), More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence, in Dumitru M. (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 265.
CalosiClaudio (2020), Priority Monism, Dependence, and Fundamentality, in Philosophical Studies
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GrandjeanVincent (2020), Une Asymétrie temporelle : passé fermé et futur ouvert, in Guillon J.-B., Duclos A. (ed.), Ed. du Collège de France, Paris, 229.
Correia Fabrice, Rosenkranz Sven (2019), Unfreezing the spotlight: tense realism and temporal passage, in Analysis
Correia F. & Skiles A. (2019), Grounding, Essence, and Identity, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
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CalosiClaudio (2019), Quantum Metaphysical Indeterminacy, in Philosophical Studies
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Calosi Claudio (2018), Is parthood identity?, in Synthese
Correia Fabrice (2018), The logic of relative fundamentality, in Synthese
CalosiClaudio (2018), Failure or Boredom. The Pendulum of Composition is Identity, in American Philosophical Quarterly
, 55(3), 281-292.
CorreiaFabrice, RosenkranzSven (2018), Nothing To Come: A Defence of the Growing Block Theory of Time
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CalosiClaudio (2018), Quantum Monism. An Assessment, in Philosophical Studies
, 175(12), 3217-3236.
CalosiClaudio (2018), Solving a Mereological Puzzle, in Thought
, 7(4), 271-277.
Correia F. (2017), An Impure Logic of Representational Grounding, in Review of Symbolic Logic
, 46, 507.
CalosiClaudio (2017), On the Possibility of Submergence, in Analysis
, (3), 501-511.
CorreiaFabrice (2017), Ontological Dependence, in Seibt J., Gerogiorgakis S., Burkhardt H., Imaguire G. (ed.), Philosophia, Munich, 391.
Correia F. (2017), Real Definitions, in Philosophical Issues
Calosi Claudio, Varzi Achille (2016), Back to Black, in Ratio
, 29(1), 1-10.
Calosi Claudio (2016), Composition is Identity and Mereological Nihilism, in The Philosophical Quarterly
, 66, 219-235.
Calosi Claudio (2016), Composition, Identity and Emergence, in Logic and Logical Philosophy
, 25, 429-443.
Calosi Claudio, Morganti Matteo (2016), Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes, in Erkenntnis
, 81(6), 1173-1194.
Correia F. (2016), On the Logic of Factual Equivalence, in Review of Symbolic Logic
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Calosi Claudio, Gilmore Cody, Costa Damiano (2016), Relativity and three four-dimensionalism, in Philosophy Compass
, 11(2), 102-120.
Correia F. (2015), Logical Grounding and First-Degree Entailments, in Lapointe S. (ed.), Brill Rodopi, Leiden, Boston, 3.
Correia F. & Rosenkranz S. (2015), Presentism without Presentness, in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
, 4, 19.
Correia F. & Rosenkranz S. (2015), Return of the Living Dead: Reply to Braddon-Mitchell, in Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
, 9, 376.
CorreiaFabrice, A New Semantic Framework for the Logic of Worldly Grounding (and Beyond), in Van De Putte F., Faroldi F. (ed.), Springer, Cham, 1.
CalosiClaudio, Interpreting Quantum Entanglement. Steps Towards Coherentist Quanum Mechanics, in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
GrandjeanVincent, Les Particuliers nus à la rescousse de la théorie du bloc en croissance, in Duclos A., Tiercelin C. (ed.), Ed. du Collège de France, Paris.
CorreiaFabrice, Ontological Dependence, Grounding, and Modality, in Shalkowski S., Bueno O. (ed.), Routledge, New York, 1.
CorreiaFabrice, RosenkranzSven, Presentism, Ockhamism and Truth-Grounding, in Santelli A. (ed.), Springer, Cham, 1.
Our representation of the world around us is one according to which the universe is full of things (people, mountains, chairs, etc.) which persist and change through time while remaining numerically the same, as well as of events and processes (wars, weddings, sunrises, etc.) of various sorts involving these things. This representation involves the determinations of things, events or processes as being past, present or future, together with the view that time flows in a well-determined direction. In addition, some of us believe that only present entities can be said to really exist; others believe that past things, events and processes also deserve that qualification; few think that future entities do.Our common representation of the world thus involves two central theses, one about time and one about its occupants: (A) There is a distinction between past, present and future, and this distinction marks an ontological asymmetry as opposed to an asymmetry in the way we have cognitive access to our environment. Moreover, time passes or flows, what is present will become past, and what is past will become even more so. (B) Time is occupied both by events and things, the former unfolding along the temporal dimension and the latter persisting and changing through time while remaining numerically the same.These two theses - as well as the question of the reality of past and future entities, which largely presupposes them - have for a long time been the subject of philosophical debate. And with the relatively recent renaissance of metaphysical concerns within philosophy, they are again among the widely debated topics. Recently, these theses have been subject to a form of scepticism, which purports to show that the very distinctions they explicitly endorse or at least presuppose are in fact illusory. Even if it is granted that the relevant distinctions do make sense, a number of arguments taken from science - especially contemporary physics - have been put forward against the commonsensical views. These arguments raise a general question: What, in general, is the relation between the “fundamental” facts uncovered by science, especially physics, and the “Moorean” world of commonsense?The aim of this project is twofold: first, to argue, against the sceptical stances, that the distinctions in question are robust; and second, to assess the prospects of a reconciliation of contemporary science and commonsense. The view, which the main investigator plans to substantiate within this project, is that both aims may be achieved in terms of relevant concepts of “fundamentality”, “grounding”, “what is really the case” and cognate notions.The project is remarkably located at a point of convergence of two recent trends, one in the philosophy of science and the other one in metaphysics: (i) philosophers of science take more and more seriously proper metaphysical inquiry, in contrast with the fact that it has been mainly concerned with epistemological issues throughout its development, and (ii) although the use of the concept of fundamentality in the debate at stake is not completely novel, of course, the past decade has witnessed a literal “boom” in the study and the application of these notions within metaphysics.The topic of fundamentality in science and philosophy is central, but underexplored, and is currently attracting much interest. Beyond its immediate impact on metaphysics, it is used virtually every sub-discipline of philosophy. It is widely believed that truths with which ethics, aesthetics, political philosophy, philosophy of language, mind, or mathematics are concerned with are in some sense derivative, i.e. non-fundamental. Thus a new conception of what it is to be fundamental could potentially influence the way these sub-disciplines conceive of, and pursue, their subject-matter.Most importantly for this project, however, the concept of fundamentality may provide the conceptual tools needed to reconcile the claims of fundamental science about how the world is fundamentally with how we ordinarily conceive it to be. The reconciliation project is of the highest importance not just for philosophy and the natural sciences individually, but also for the broader issue of making fundamental science accountable to society.The research group will be composed of the main investigator, a post-doc and a PhD student, who will work in close cooperation at all stages of the project. Both the application of the notion of fundamentality to the reconciliation project and its characterisation will be pursued simultaneously, thereby investigating its logic both “top-down” and “bottom-up”. The research of the project members will be bolstered by their integration within the research environment provided by the centre of metaphysics eidos (http://www.philosophie.ch/eidos/), directed by the main investigator and Kevin Mulligan (Geneva), which has been very active since the beginning of its existence seven years ago, and has over the years gained international visibility and respect.The concrete output of the project is expected to consist in (a) a considerable output of publications in top-level international journals, (b) international scientific events (2 workshops or 1 bigger conference per year) to benefit from the feedback by researchers working in the area and to promote the results of the research, (c) a PhD completed, (d) a strengthening of already existing scientific collaboration between the main investigator and his team and other groups or people, in Switzerland and abroad, and hopefully the creation of new collaborations.