parliament; accountability; institutional design; political parties; voting; roll call votes; party discipline
Hug Simon (2017), Le vote en assemblée parlementaire, in Deloye Yves, Mayer Nonna (ed.), Larcier, Bruxelles, 547-592.
Hug Simon, Wegmann Simone, Wüest Reto (2015), Parliamentary Voting Procedures in Comparison, in West European Politics
, 38(5), 940-968.
Hug Simon, Lukacs Richard, Hug Simon, Lukacs Richard (2014), Preferences or blocs? Voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council, in Review of International Organizations
Hug Simon, Wegmann Simone, Hug Simon, Wegmann Simone (2013), Ten years in the United Nations: Where does Switzerland stand?, in SWISS POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
, 19(2), 212-232.
Hug Simon, Martin Danielle, Hug Simon, Martin Danielle (2012), How electoral systems affect MPs’ positions ☆, in Electoral Studies
, 31(1), 192-200.
MartinDanielle, HugSimon, Constituency preferences and MP preferences: the electoral connection, in Party Politics
Hug Simon, Hug Simon, Parliamentary voting, in Müller Wolfgang C., Müller Wolfgang C. (ed.), Springer, NewYork, NA-NA.
Traber Denise, Hug Simon, Sciarini Pascal, Traber Denise, Hug Simon, Sciarini Pascal, Party Unity in the Swiss Parliament. The Electoral Connection, in Journal of Legislative Studies
, NA(NA), NA-NA.
Analyses of roll call votes have developed to form a mainstay ofparliamentary research. By their development both in terms of methodsused as in substantive (and geographic) areas covered, more and moreresearchers have become aware that in many instances roll call votesonly give us a partial glimpse at parliamentary behavior. The reason forthis is that in many parliaments roll call votes need to be requested oroccur only on particular proposals. Based on this observation theproposed project wishes to address the following overarching researchquestion:Under what circumstances are roll call votes requested in nationalparliaments and how do these circumstances affect our inferences onparliamentary behavior based on roll call votes?To answer this research question the project is based on threeinterdependent goals. The first goal is to establish a detailedinventory of the institutional rules under which roll call votes occurin all national parliaments around the world. To achieve this goal aninternet-based survey will be carried out among experts of the variousnational parliaments following the lead example of a recent handbook.Based on this inventory an existing theoretical model will be expandedto consider different motivations for making roll call requests, namelythe disciplining of party members, the signaling of party positions andthe shaming of other parties for their voting behavior. This theoreticalmodel will allow for a more precise assessment of the relationshipbetween observed voting behavior in parliaments through roll call votesand unobserved behavior in secret (or voice votes).The implications of this theoretical model will be submitted toempirical tests, which forms the third goal. More specifically theempirical tests envision to study the consequences that the differentrules and reasons for requesting roll call votes have on empiricalanalyses based on roll call votes. These empirical tests should alsoallow for insights how the results from roll call votes analyses have tobe corrected for, given that they are based on only a (non-random)sample of all votes in most parliaments.