justifiction; lottery; beliefs; paradox; permisions; epistemology
Logins Artūrs (2016), Necessary truths, evidence, and knowledge, in
Filosofia Unisinos, 17(3), 302-307.
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Qu'est-ce qu'une raison?, Vrin, Paris.
A central concept within contemporary epistemology is the concept of epistemic justification. Contemporary mainstream epistemology has been concerned almost exclusively with the nature of the specific (necessary and sufficient) non-trivial conditions for epistemically justified belief. In particular, relatively little has been done with respect to the foundational issue concerning the property of epistemic justification. The present project aims to fulfil this theoretical gap. The ambition of the project is to provide a full blown meta-theoretical account of epistemic justification. To achieve this aim, the project will focus on a recent work on the Lottery Paradox. It seems that the recent work on Lottery Paradox can provide a precise and promising line for a satisfactory treatment of the meta-theoretical question of epistemic justification.