Project

Back to overview

Normative Phenomenology

English title Normative Phenomenology
Applicant Nida-Rümelin Martine
Number 150139
Funding scheme Project funding (Div. I-III)
Research institution Departement für Philosophie Philosophische Fakultät Universität Freiburg
Institution of higher education University of Fribourg - FR
Main discipline Philosophy
Start/End 01.01.2014 - 31.12.2015
Approved amount 148'347.00
Show all

Keywords (3)

Phenomenology; Metaethics; Normative Judgment

Lay Summary (German)

Lead
Gibt es eine spezifische Phänomenologie normativer Urteile? Falls dem so ist, welche Rolle spielt diese Phänomenologie für eine Theorie des normativen Urteilens?
Lay summary

This project will focus on one particular phenomenological feature – the appearance of bindingness. The main goals of this project are:

  1. to assess whether this phenomenology can help demarcate normative from non-normative judgment; and
  2. to tackle a central objection to the idea that phenomenal experiences play an essential role in an account of normative judgment: not all normative judgments are accompanied by the relevant phenomenology.

The project will contribute to the contemporary debate about the nature of normative judgment. It helps address a long-standing neglect of phenomenal aspects of normative thinking. The project brings theoretical tools developed in thinking about the role of phenomenology in perception to bear on a new domain, opening up new avenues for research and potential collaboration between two very active areas of contemporary philosophical research, perceptual belief and practical reasoning.

Deutsche Fassung: Im Zentrum des Projekts steht ein spezieller phänomenaler Aspekt - der Eindruck von 'Bindung' in dem Sinne in dem eine Norm für eine Person bindend sein kann. Die Hauptziele des Projekts sind:

1. herauszufinden ob dieser besondere phänomenale Aspekt hilfreich ist in der Abgrenzung normativer Urteile von anderen Urteilen; und

2. dem wichtigen Einwand gegen einen solchen Ansatz zu begegnen, der auf den Hinweis gestützt ist, dass nicht alle normativen Urteile diese Phänomenologie aufweisen.

In der zeitgenössischen Debatte über die Natur normativer Urteile wird der phänomenale Aspekt normativen Denkens seit langem vernachlässigt. Das Projekt wird dazu beitragen, diese Lücke zu schliessen. Es wird hierbei Forschungsergebnisse aus der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung für die Philosophie des praktischen Denkens nutzbar machen. 

 

 

Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 26.11.2013

Responsible applicant and co-applicants

Employees

Associated projects

Number Title Start Funding scheme
166320 Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness 01.12.2016 Project funding (Div. I-III)

Abstract

Is there a distinctive phenomenology of normative judgment? In the case of colour judgment, e.g. when you judge pomegranates are red, there is a distinctive visual phenomenology associated with your understanding of ‘red’. Is there a similar phenomenological aspect in the case of your understanding of ‘ought’, e.g. when you judge that you ought not eat meat, or you ought to renew your driver’s licence? If so, what role does this phenomenology play in an account of normative judgment?This project will focus on one particular phenomenological feature - the appearance of bindingness - that has recently attracted attention in the metaethical literature on normative judgment. The main goals of this project are: (i) to assess whether this phenomenology can help demarcate normative from non-normative judgment; and (ii) to tackle a central objection to the idea that phenomenal experiences play an essential role in an account of normative judgment: not all normative judgments are accompanied by the relevant phenomenology.The project will make an important contribution to debates about the nature of normative judgment. It helps address a long-standing neglect of phenomenal aspects of normative thinking. The project brings theoretical tools developed in thinking about the role of phenomenology in perception to bear on a new domain, opening up new avenues for research and potential collaboration between two very active areas of contemporary philosophical research, perceptual belief and practical reasoning.
-