Science; Causality; Truthmaking; Modality; Liar-paradoxes; Essence; Grounding; Metaphysics; Dependence; Explanation; Truth; Logic; Counterfactuals
Schnieder Benjamin (2020), Grounding and Dependence, in Synthese
, 197, 95-124.
Correia Fabrice & Skiles Alex (2019), Grounding, Essence, and Identity, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
, 98(3), 642-670.
Clark Michael & Wildman Nathan (2018), Grounding, mental causation, and overdetermination, in Synthese
, 195, 3723-3733.
Plate Jan (2018), Intrinsic Properties and Relations, in Inquiry
, 61, 783-853.
Wildman Nathan (2018), On Shaky Ground?, in Bliss R. and Priest G. (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 275.
Clark Michael (2018), What grounds what grounds what, in Philosophical Quarterly
, 68, 38.
Wildman N. (2017), A Note on Morato on Modality and Explanation, in Erkenntnis
, 82, 967.
Casini Lorenzo & Baumgartner Michael (2017), An Abductive Theory of Constitution, in Philosophy of Science
, 84, 214.
Correia Fabrice (2017), An Impure Logic of Representational Grounding, in Journal of Philosophical Logic
, 46, 507.
Carnino Pablo (2017), Fondation Métaphysique, in L'Encyclopédie Philosophique
Weber Marcel (2017), How Objective Are Biological Functions?, in Synthese
Walker Jan (2017), Intuitionism vs. Classicism. A Mathematical Attack on Classical Logic -- by Nick Haverkamp, in Dialectica
, 71, 641.
Correia Fabrice (2017), La question de l'ontologie (French translation of Kit Fine's "The Question of Ontology"), in Schneider L. Nef F. and Schmitt Y. (ed.), Vrin, Paris, 55.
Casini Lorenzo (2017), Malfunctions and Teleology: On the (Dim) Chances of Statistical Accounts of Functions, in European Journal for the Philosophy of Science
, 7, 319.
Merlo Giovanni (2017), Multiple reference and vague objects, in Synthese
, 194, 2645.
Correia Fabrice (2017), Ontological Dependence, in Burkhardt Hans et al. (ed.), Philosophia, Munich, 379.
Schnieder Benjamin & Kappes Yannic (2017), Optimalism and the Grounds of Existential Truths, in Phil. Jahrbuch
, 124, 264.
Correia Fabrice (2017), Real Definitions, in Philosophical Issues
, 27, 52.
Weber Marcel (2017), Which Kind of Causal Specificity Matters Biologically?, in Philosophy of Science
, 84, 574.
Casini Lorenzo & Manzo Gianluca (2016), Agent-based models and causality: a methodological appraisal, in The IAS Working Paper Series
, 7, 1.
Schnieder Benjamin & Kappes Yannic (2016), Anything at All – the Deepest and the Shallowest Question, in Philosophische Yahrbuch
B. Schnieder & Y. Kappes (2016), Anything at All – the Deepest and the Shallowest Questionx, in Philosophische Yahrbuch
Casini Lorenzo (2016), Can Interventions Rescue Glennan’s Mechanistic Account of Causality?, in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Carnino Pablo (2016), Grounding is Not Superinternal, in Thought: a journal of philosophy
Wildman Nathan (2016), How (not) to be a modalist about essence, in Jago Mark (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 177.
Casini Lorenzo (2016), How to Model Mechanistic Hierarchies, in Philosophy of Science
Schnieder Benjamin (2016), In Defence of a Logic for ‘Because’, in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic
Plate Jan (2016), Logically Simple Properties and Relations, in Philosophers' Imprint
Weber Marcel (2016), On the Incompatibility of Biological Dynamical Mechanisms and Causal Graphs, in Philosophy of Science
Correia Fabrice (2016), On the Logic of Factual Equivalence, in Review of Symbolic Logic
Merlo Giovanni (2016), Subjectivism and the Mental, in Dialectica
Weber Marcel (2016), Wissenschaftlicher Pluralismus und die Bio-Gerontologie, in A. Blum et al (ed.), Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 107.
Schnieder Benjamin and Steinberg Alex (2016), Without Reason?, in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
, 97, 523.
Clark Michael (2015), A Puzzle About Partial Grounding, in Thought
, 4(3), 189.
Schnieder Benjamin (2015), Das Meisterargument in Platons Euthyphron, in History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis
Casini Lorenzo (2015), Editorial and Interview with F. Correia, B. Schnieder, and M. Weber, in The Reasoner
, 9(2), 9.
Correia Fabrice (2015), Logical Grounding and First-Degree Entailments, in Grazer Philosophische Studien
, 91, 3.
Schnieder Benjamin (2015), The Asymmetry of “Because”, in Grazer Philosophische Studien
, 91, 131.
Schnieder Benjamin (2014), Bolzano on Causation and Grounding, in Journal of the History of Philosophy
, 52, 309-337.
Carnino Pablo (2014), Essence et fondation, in The Ethics Forum
, 9(2), 190.
Weber Marcel (2014), Experimental Modeling in Biology. In-vivo Representation and Stand-ins as Modeling Strategies, in Philosophy of Science
, 81, 756.
Correia Fabrice (2014), From Grounding to Truth-Making: Some Thoughts, in Reboul Anne (ed.), Springer, Berlin, 85.
Correia Fabrice (2014), Logical Grounds, in Review of Symbolic Logic
, 7(1), 31.
Weber Marcel et al. (ed.) (2014), New Directions in the Philosophy of Science
, Springer, Berlin.
Casini Lorenzo (2014), Not-so-minimal Models. Between Isolation and Imagination, in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
, 44(5), 646.
Carnino Pablo (2014), On the Reduction of Grounding to Essence, in Studia Philosophica Estonica
, 7(2), 56.
Weber Marcel (2014), Qu'est-ce qu'une vache ?, in O. Massin & A. Meylan (ed.), Ithaque, Paris, 1.
Weber Marcel (2014), Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds, in Dutant Julien et al. (ed.), University of Geneva, Geneva, 422.
Casini Lorenzo (2014), Report on the Project “Grounding: Metaphysics, Science and Logic”, in The Reasoner
, 8(9), 101.
Wildman Nathan (2014), Review of Writing the Book of the World by T. Sider, in European Journal of Philosophy
, 22(S2), e21.
Weber Marcel et al. (2013), Philosophie der Lebenswissenschaften: Entwicklungen und Tendenzen, in Information Philosophie
, 4, 14.
Correia Fabrice, More on the Reduction of Necessity to Essence, in Dumitru Mircea (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Weber Marcel, Scientific Realism: Biology, in Saatsi J. (ed.), Routledge, London.
Correia Fabrice, The Logic of Relative Fundamentality, in Synthese
Weber Marcel et al., Thought Experiments in Biology, in Brown J. R. et al. (ed.), Routledge, London.
G. Merlo, Three questions about immunity to error through misidentification, in Erkenntnis
The idea that reality is not constituted by a mere juxtaposition of facts, but rather displays a complex network of facts of various degrees of "fundamentality" or "basicness", is probably as old as philosophical and scientific thinking about reality itself. What determines these degrees of fundamentality is most naturally thought of as the relation of one fact holding in virtue of other facts - or, as philosophers currently like to say, the relation of one fact being grounded in other facts.The notion of grounding has been prominent throughout the history of philosophy, and it can be found at work already in Plato’s Euthyphro and in Aristotle’s conception of the four causes (aitia). Yet it has not been a proper object of serious philosophical inquiry since Bernard Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre (1837) - a truly ground-breaking but largely neglected work - until very recently.Things indeed changed only in the last decade or so, starting with Kit Fine’s seminal article "The Question of Realism" (2001), and subsequent publications by two of the three applicants for this project in the mid 2000’s, Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder. By now, the notion of grounding has re-entered the philosophical stage and has become a hot topic, propagated in particular by the work of leading philosophers such as Kit Fine, Gideon Rosen and Jonathan Schaffer. While sceptical attacks have been launched, they have already been rebutted, and the general idea of grounding has been widely accepted and recognised as one of the most important notions to be used in order to describe and account for the structure of reality.The recent comeback of grounding at the forefront of philosophical inquiry may be attributed to two main factors. There is, in the first place, the relatively recent renewal of philosophical interest in realist metaphysics - and, more generally, in areas of inquiry which purport to describe an objective, mind-independent reality. This renewal of interest followed a long period of scepticism or even sheer dismissal, most often associated with philosophical movements as diverse as the Kantian school, the positivists of the Vienna Circle, and advocates of the linguistic turn and natural language analysis. And there is, in the second place, the even more recent tendency of philosophers to minimise (but without ignoring) the general requirement of ideological economy, which has had an excessive influence on theoretical philosophising during the greatest part of the 20th century. By minimising this requirement, philosophers have felt free to use certain conceptual resources which would have been otherwise prohibited, in particular certain broadly Aristotelian concepts like those of essence or substance - or again, the concept of grounding.Because the renaissance of grounding is a very recent phenomenon, the contemporary debate about a number of central issues concerning the notion - e.g. how it is exactly to be understood, what its connections with other important notions are, what role it can be taken to play in various debates and areas of inquiry - is currently fully underway, and many other such issues are still to be addressed. The current research project purports to further this debate, by selecting and addressing some among the most important of these issues.An important assumption of this project, which has been defended by a number of authors, is that grounding comes in various sorts or types. In this project, we focus on the core notion of metaphysical grounding, and on three other notions which are intimately connected to it, viz. causal, logical and conceptual grounding. These four notions play a central role in the three philosophical disciplines regrouped within the project, namely metaphysics, the philosophy of natural science, and logic. The general overall goal we expect to achieve is to further our understanding and knowledge of these various sorts of grounding relations, as well as their interrelations to other important concepts employed in these three interconnected disciplines. A notable feature of the project is that it takes on board the philosophy of science, whereas the current debate mainly involves metaphysics and logic. This, as it were, fixes an oddity, since the general idea of some facts grounding other facts - in particular, the idea of some facts causally grounding other facts and the idea of some facts grounding the facts of causation themselves - is certainly central to the natural sciences.