Project

Back to overview

Knowledge, Rationality and Choice

English title Knowledge, Rationality and Choice
Applicant Dutant Julien
Number 145323
Funding scheme Fellowships for advanced researchers
Research institution London School of Economics Dept. of Philosophy
Institution of higher education Institution abroad - IACH
Main discipline Philosophy
Start/End 01.08.2013 - 31.07.2015
Show all

Keywords (7)

Knowledge; Rationality; Decision theory; Bayesianism; Belief; Reasons; Norms

Lay Summary (French)

Lead
Le projet vise à réconcilier nos théories fondamentales de la rationalité avec la façon dont les experts, les acteurs politiques et économiques et les citoyens ordinaires conçoivent la rationalité des décisions et des croyances.
Lay summary

Ce qu'on doit faire et ce que qu'on doit croire dépend de ce qu'on sait. C'est là la façon dont les acteurs politiques et économiques, les experts scientifiques et les citoyens ordinaires pensent: par exemple, si nous ne savons pas si un médicament est sans risque, nous ne devons pas le mettre sur le marché. Cette idée est toutefois rejetée par les théories dominantes de la rationalité. La théorie de la décision orthodoxe, les théories bayésiennes de la rationalité scientifique et de nombreuses théories éthiques soutiennent que la rationalité des choix et des opinions scientifiques dépendent de ce que nous croyons et expérimentons plutôt que de ce que nous savons. Des développements récents dans la philosophie de la connaissance remettent ces idées en cause. Le projet s'appuie sur ces derniers pour développer une théorie de la rationalité en termes de connaissance. Il vise à réconcilier nos théories fondamentales de la rationalité avec la façon dont les experts, les acteurs politiques et économiques et les citoyens ordinaires conçoivent la rationalité des décisions et des croyances.

Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 15.12.2012

Lay Summary (English)

Lead
The project aims at reconciling our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens ordinarily think about rational decision and belief.
Lay summary
What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. That is the way many decision makers, scientific experts and ordinary citizens think: for instance, if we do not know whether a drug is safe enough, we should not market it. The idea is rejected, however, by dominant theories of rationality. Standard decision theory, bayesian accounts of scientific rationality and many ethical theories hold that rational choice and rational theory acceptance depend on what we believe or experience rather than what we know. Recent developments in epistemology have challenged these views. The project builds on them to develop a full-blown account of rationality in terms of knowledge. It aims at reconciling our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens ordinarily think about rational decision and belief.
Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 15.12.2012

Responsible applicant and co-applicants

Publications

Publication
Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel
Dutant Julien, Fassio Davide, Meylan Anne (2014), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge
Dutant Julien (2014), The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge, in Fassio Davide, Meylan Anne, Dutant Julien (ed.), 200-227.
In Defence of Swamping
Dutant Julien (2013), In Defence of Swamping, in Thought, 2(4), 357-366.
Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?
Dutant Julien, Olsson Erik (2013), Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?, in Erkenntnis, 78(6), 1347-1365.
Introduction
Dutant Julien, Introduction, in Dutant Julien, Dorsch Fabian (ed.), 1.
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis
Dutant Julien, The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis, in Philosophical Perspectives, 1.
The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality
Dutant Julien, Dorsch Fabian (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality.
The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge
Dutant Julien, The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge, in Julien Dutant Davide Fassio Anne Meylan (ed.), 200-227.
Truth and Epistemic Norms
Dutant Julien, Fassio Davide (ed.), Truth and Epistemic Norms, Meylan, Anne, Synthese (journal special issue).

Scientific events

Active participation

Title Type of contribution Title of article or contribution Date Place Persons involved
American Philosophical Association - Central Division Meeting Talk given at a conference Comment on Kok Yong Lee’s “The Distinctive Value of Knowledge” 18.02.2015 St. Louis, MO, United States of America Dutant Julien;
Sociedad Filosófica Ibero Americana XXth meeting Talk given at a conference Comment on Juan Comesaña's “Can we believe for practical reasons?” 12.01.2015 Huatulco, Mexico Dutant Julien;
Formal Epistemology Workgroup Individual talk Safety and Inference 17.11.2014 University of Michigan, United States of America Dutant Julien;
The New Evil Demon Talk given at a conference Knowledge-Based Decision Theory and the New Evil Demon. 12.09.2014 Université de Genève, Switzerland Dutant Julien;
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association Talk given at a conference Is the Not-so-Evil Demon victim Gettiered 11.07.2014 University of Cambridge, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Dutant Julien;
John Broome on his recently published 'Rationality Through Reasoning' Talk given at a conference Enkrasia and the semantics of "ought" 20.06.2014 Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium Dutant Julien;
Workshop with Jessica Brown Talk given at a conference Brown on epistemic propriety and submaximality 10.04.2014 Université de Genève, Switzerland Dutant Julien;
Philosophy Colloquium Individual talk The Normative Sceptical Paradox 05.02.2014 University of York, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Dutant Julien;


Self-organised

Title Date Place
The New Evil Demon 12.09.2013 Université de Genève, Switzerland

Abstract

What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. Commonplace at it seems, the idea is rejected by dominant theories of rationality. Decision theorists, bayesian philosophers of science and many ethicists hold that what is rational to do only depends on what we think we know or what we seem to know. Recent developments in epistemology are challenging these views. They explore new ways of integrating theories of knowledge and rationality. Their goal is to reconcile our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens commonly think about rational decision and belief. The present project is part of that movement. It will contribute to these developments by building on my past research in epistemology and expanding it towards the theory of rationality.
-