phenomenology; agency; freedom; thought; illusion; action; phenomenological reflection; free will; mental action; mental causation; agent-causation
Baierlé Emmanuel (2013), Sollte das Standardmodell der mentalen Verursachung aufgegeben werden?, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch
, 120. Jahrgang(1. Halbban), 124-130.
Müller Franziska, I was not aware I was doing that, in Dell'Utri Fabio B. M., Caputo Stefano (ed.), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambriddge.
Baierlé Emmanuel, Review of Erasmus Mayr - Understanding Human Agency, in Dialectica
The project aims at the development of a general empirically informed philosophical theory of agency which covers the realm of bodily as well as mental action. The analysis of how we experience ourselves in our bodily and mental behaviour (phenomenological reflection) will play a central role in the development of the vocabulary and the theoretical account. Subproject 'Bodily Action': We will investigate the phenomenology of bodily action, deliberation and decisions to act in order to use the results for an evaluation of philosophical theories of agency and human freedom. The phenomenology of agency can put constraints on theories of agency: philosophical and ontological theories of what it is to act and what it is to act freely should not imply that we are the victim of a permanent and ubiquitous illusion. Phenomenological constraints of this kind, however, cannot be decisive: they might be overruled by other theoretical considerations and by results in the empirical sciences. The interpretation of relevant empirical data in cognitive science and neurology must therefore be taken into consideration and integrated into the overall evaluation of theories of agency. Subproject 'Mental Agency:The aim of this part of the project is to extend the research on the phenomenology of agency to the phenomenology of mental action. Like in the realm of bodily movements there is, in the domain of mental episodes, a distinction to be drawn between what the thinker does actively and what merely happens to the thinker. A central aim of the project is to provide an account of this difference between active and passive in the mental realm. We will base the account on a careful phenomenological analysis of what it is like to experience oneself as active in one’s mental doings. We will investigate whether and how the account of the difference between active and passive can be integrated into a general theory of agency.