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First person access, phenomenal reflection and phenomenal concepts

English title First person access, phenomenal reflection and phenomenal concepts
Applicant Nida-Rümelin Martine
Number 118610
Funding scheme ProDoc
Research institution Departement für Philosophie Philosophische Fakultät Universität Freiburg
Institution of higher education University of Fribourg - FR
Main discipline Philosophy
Start/End 01.06.2008 - 31.05.2011
Approved amount 145'039.00
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Keywords (15)

phenomenal reflexion; phenomenal properties; phenomenal concepts; phenomenal concept strategy; explanatory gap; first person access; phenomenology of perception; phenomenology of agency; ontological status of consciousness; materialism; dualism; phenomenal consciousness; transparency of experience; intrinsic phenomenal character; representationalism about qualia,

Lay Summary (English)

Lay summary
The main aim of the project is the develop of a new account of phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts are concepts of kinds of experiences and they are formed on the basis of having experiences of the relevant kind oneself (they presuppose first person access to the kinds at issue). Phenomenal concepts are used in thoughts about our own experiences and those of others. Contrary to what may be found in the relevant literature, the account to be developed in the project will be based on a careful analysis of the conceptual framework used in so-called phenomenological reflection. We will address a challenge that has not found sufficient interest in the discussion of phenomenal concepts: the challenge provided by the intuition of transparency, - the intuition that phenomenal kinds of experiences are characterized by the properties that things appear to have in these experiences. We will try to develop an account of phenomenal concepts that does duty to the transparency intuition and at the same time preserves the idea that experiences have intrinsic subjective character that cannot be reduced to the properties represented in the experience. The account of phenomenal concepts will be used for a critical analyses of alternative accounts of phenomenal concepts, - accounts that are developed in order to show that anti-materialist intuitions are cognitive illusions that can be explained in a way compatible with materialism by our specific cognitive architecture.
Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 21.02.2013

Responsible applicant and co-applicants


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Associated projects

Number Title Start Funding scheme
132455 Philosophy and Phenomenology of Agency 01.10.2010 ProDoc
166320 Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Awareness 01.12.2016 Project funding (Div. I-III)
189031 The Subject of Experiences: The Significance of its Metaphysical Nature in the Philosophy of Mind 01.12.2019 Project funding (Div. I-III)