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Learning to play hardball from established powers? Emerging countries and trade remedies
Type of publication
Peer-reviewed
Publikationsform
Original article (peer-reviewed)
Author
Elsig Manfred and Serrano Omar,
Project
Understanding Power Transitions in the Global Economy. Regulatory Politics in Flux
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Original article (peer-reviewed)
Journal
European Foreign Affairs Review
Title of proceedings
European Foreign Affairs Review
Abstract
This paper analyses how supply and demand dynamics have shaped emerging economies’ regulatory learning of the design and use of trade remedy laws at the multilateral level and through preferential trade agreements from industrialised countries (in particular the EU and the US). Trade remedy laws allow states to withdraw temporarily from certain international commitments. In addition to mapping the strategic positions related to existing international obligations, the paper focuses on actual implementation of trade remedy law. We are guided by the following questions: How can we measure a US or EU template in regulation (supply side)? Are there types of countries that follow a template different from the US or EU? To what degree do we witness states mimicking the behaviour of the leading economies? We first map patterns across emerging markets to detect regulatory preferences by collecting information on the positions and change of positions of WTO Members in the context of the multilateral negotiations. We then focus on the actual behaviour by analysing the application of trade remedy laws. How does application evolve over time? We apply mixed methods conducting a quantitative test on a broader sample of emerging economies followed by more in-depth case studies on selected countries to flesh out the potential causal mechanisms.
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