Projekt

vagueness; formal concepts; indeterminacy

Lead
Begriffe wie KONJUNKTION, DISJUNKTION, NEGATION, IDENTITÄT, EXISTENZ, ALLE, FOLGERUNG, NOTWENDIGKEIT, MÖGLICHKEIT, KONTINGENZ, ESSENTIALITÄT, TEIL, ABHÄNGIGKEIT, FUNDIERUNG, TATSACHE, ZAHL und STRUKTUR zählen zu den essenziellen Bestandteilen philosophischer Theorien, Definitionen und Analysen und sind als solche von besonderer Bedeutung für die Philosophie. Im Anschluss an Husserl, lässt sich die Familie, denen die oben genannten Begriffe zugehören, als die der formalen Begriffe bezeichnen. Eine Standardannahme unter Philosophen die in der Tradition der analytischen Philosophie arbeiten, ist, dass formale Begriffe präzise und damit frei von jeglicher Unbestimmtheit sind.
Lay summary
Die Annahme, dass formale Begriffe präzise sind, wird üblicherweise für selbstverständlich gehalten oder schlicht als wahr vorausgesetzt. Es gibt jedoch einige wenige Philosophen, die dafür argumentieren, dass einzelne formale Begriffe unbestimmt sind und aus diesem Grund diese Annahme ablehnen. Darüber hinaus wurde in der neueren Literatur zur metaphysischen Unbestimmtheit dafür argumentiert, dass es Fälle gibt, in denen es unbestimmt ist, ob ein Gegenstand existiert oder ob zwei Gegenstände identisch sind, oder in denen es unbestimmt ist, ob ein Gegenstand ein Teil eines anderen Gegenstandes ist. Die entsprechenden Argumente stellen die Annahme, dass formale Begriffe präzise und frei von Unbestimmtheit sind zusätzlich in Frage. Das Projekt ist die erste allgemeine systematische Untersuchung der Frage ob formale Begriffe unbestimmt sein können. Diese Frage ist für die analytische Philosophie von grundlegender Bedeutung, da eine positive Antwort ihre methodologischen Grundlagen in Frage stellt. Ziel des Projektes ist es, bestehende Argumente gegen die Annahme, dass formale Begriffe präzise sind auszuwerten und neuartige Argumente für diese Annahme zu entwickeln und kritisch zu prüfen.

Direktlink auf Lay Summary

Letzte Aktualisierung: 03.10.2014

Lead
Concepts such as CONJUNCTION, DISJUNCTION, NEGATION, IDENTITY, EXISTENCE, ALL, ENTAILMENT, NECESSITY, POSSIBILITY, CONTINGENCY, ESSENTIALITY, PARTHOOD, DEPENDENCE, GROUNDING, FACT, STRUCTURE, NUMBER are of special interest to philosophers, since they are essential components of philosophical theories, definitions and analyses. Following Husserl's terminology, one may call the family of concepts that they belong to formal concepts. Formal concepts are also of methodological importance to other academic discipline which rely on formal methods. A standard assumption among analytic philosophers is that these concepts are precise and free of indeterminacy.
Lay summary
The assumption that formal concepts are precise is often taken to be self-evident or simply presupposed to be true. However, there are a select few dissenters who have directly argued that particular formal concepts are affected by indeterminacy. Claims that there are cases of indeterminate existence, parthood or identity, which have been made in the recent literature on metaphysical indeterminacy, seem to put further pressure on the assumption. The research project is the first systematic investigation of the question of whether formal concepts can be indeterminate. This is a question of fundamental importance to analytic philosophy, since a positive answer would pose a significant threat to its methodological foundations. The goal of the project is to both evaluate existing challenges to the assumption that formal concepts are precise and to develop and assess arguments in its favour.

Direktlink auf Lay Summary

Letzte Aktualisierung: 03.10.2014

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Concepts such as conjunction, disjunction, negation, identity, existence, all, entailment, necessity, possibility, contingency, essentiality, parthood, dependence, grounding, fact, structure, number are essential components of philosophical theories, definitions and analyses. Following Husserl's terminology, one may call the family of concepts that they belong to formal concepts. A standard assumption among analytic philosophers is that these concepts are precise and free of indeterminacy. It is so well-entrenched that it is often presupposed but not made explicit or outright presented as an obvious truth. Lewis for example considers the question of whether the truth-functional connectives, “the words for identity and difference, and for the partial identity of overlap”, and “the idioms of quantification, so long as they are unrestricted” can be indeterminate to be purely rhetorical. (See Lewis 1986, p. 212.) There are however a select few dissenters who have argued that particular formal concepts are affected by indeterminacy. (See Russell 1923, Field 1994.) Furthermore, the emerging literature on metaphysical indeterminacy prominently features a family of theories which allow for cases of indeterminate existence or identity. (See Barnes 2009, Barnes 2013, Williams 2008, Williams & Barnes 2011.) The proposed research project will be the first systematic investigation of the question of whether formal concepts are susceptible to indeterminacy. This is a question of fundamental importance to analytic philosophy, since a positive answer would pose a significant threat to its methodological foundations. The research project will be subdivided into three parts. The first part systematically clarifies the different kinds of indeterminacy relevant to the project (part A). The second part is dedicated to the investigation of arguments for the claim that formal concepts are precise (part B). In the third part of the project, existing arguments for the indeterminacy of particular formal concepts will be discussed and evaluated (part C). Since formal concepts constitute the structural basis for philosophical theories, the outcomes of the project should be of significant interest to any philosopher interested in foundational and methodological questions about philosophy itself. Since philosophy is not the only discipline which crucially relies on formal concepts, the questions pursued within the project will also be relevant to researchers in other disciplines, such as computer science, mathematics and linguistics, who are interested in fundamental methodological questions. Apart from these contributions to the meta-theory of philosophy and the formal sciences, the project also promises to make substantial contributions to the philosophical discussions about indeterminacy, the philosophy of logic and metaphysics. BibliographyBarnes, Elizabeth (2009). Indeterminacy, identity and counterparts: Evans reconsidered. Synthese 168 (1):81-96.Barnes, Elizabeth (2013). Metaphysically indeterminate existence. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):495-510.Field, Hartry (1994). Are Our Logical and Mathematical Concepts Highly Indeterminate? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):391-429.Lewis, David K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.Russell, Bertrand (1923). Vagueness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):84-92.Williams, Robert (2008). Multiple Actualities and Ontically Vague Identity. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.Williams, J. Robert G. & Barnes, Elizabeth (2011). A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy. In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 6. Oxford University Press.