Projekt

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Knowledge, Rationality and Choice

Titel Englisch Knowledge, Rationality and Choice
Gesuchsteller/in Dutant Julien
Nummer 145323
Förderungsinstrument Stipendien für fortgeschrittene Forschende
Forschungseinrichtung
Faculty of Philosophy University of Oxford
Department of Philosophy University of Michigan
London School of Economics Dept. of Philosophy
Hochschule Institution ausserhalb der Schweiz - IACH
Hauptdisziplin Philosophie
Beginn/Ende 01.08.2013 - 31.07.2015
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Keywords (7)

Knowledge; Rationality; Decision theory; Bayesianism; Belief; Reasons; Norms

Lay Summary (Französisch)

Lead
Le projet vise à réconcilier nos théories fondamentales de la rationalité avec la façon dont les experts, les acteurs politiques et économiques et les citoyens ordinaires conçoivent la rationalité des décisions et des croyances.
Lay summary

Ce qu'on doit faire et ce que qu'on doit croire dépend de ce qu'on sait. C'est là la façon dont les acteurs politiques et économiques, les experts scientifiques et les citoyens ordinaires pensent: par exemple, si nous ne savons pas si un médicament est sans risque, nous ne devons pas le mettre sur le marché. Cette idée est toutefois rejetée par les théories dominantes de la rationalité. La théorie de la décision orthodoxe, les théories bayésiennes de la rationalité scientifique et de nombreuses théories éthiques soutiennent que la rationalité des choix et des opinions scientifiques dépendent de ce que nous croyons et expérimentons plutôt que de ce que nous savons. Des développements récents dans la philosophie de la connaissance remettent ces idées en cause. Le projet s'appuie sur ces derniers pour développer une théorie de la rationalité en termes de connaissance. Il vise à réconcilier nos théories fondamentales de la rationalité avec la façon dont les experts, les acteurs politiques et économiques et les citoyens ordinaires conçoivent la rationalité des décisions et des croyances.

Direktlink auf Lay Summary Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.12.2012

Lay Summary (Englisch)

Lead
The project aims at reconciling our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens ordinarily think about rational decision and belief.
Lay summary
What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. That is the way many decision makers, scientific experts and ordinary citizens think: for instance, if we do not know whether a drug is safe enough, we should not market it. The idea is rejected, however, by dominant theories of rationality. Standard decision theory, bayesian accounts of scientific rationality and many ethical theories hold that rational choice and rational theory acceptance depend on what we believe or experience rather than what we know. Recent developments in epistemology have challenged these views. The project builds on them to develop a full-blown account of rationality in terms of knowledge. It aims at reconciling our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens ordinarily think about rational decision and belief.
Direktlink auf Lay Summary Letzte Aktualisierung: 15.12.2012

Verantw. Gesuchsteller/in und weitere Gesuchstellende

Publikationen

Publikation
Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel
(2014), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge
(2014), The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge, 200-227.
In Defence of Swamping
(2013), In Defence of Swamping, in Thought, 2(4), 357-366.
Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?
(2013), Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?, in Erkenntnis, 78(6), 1347-1365.
Introduction
, Introduction, 1.
The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis
, The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis, in Philosophical Perspectives, 1.
The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality
The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, , The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality.
The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge
, The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge, 200-227.
Truth and Epistemic Norms
Truth and Epistemic Norms, , Truth and Epistemic Norms.

Wissenschaftliche Veranstaltungen

Aktiver Beitrag

Titel Art des Beitrags Titel des Artikels oder Beitrages Datum Ort Beteiligte Personen
American Philosophical Association - Central Division Meeting Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung Comment on Kok Yong Lee’s “The Distinctive Value of Knowledge” 18.02.2015 St. Louis, MO, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika Dutant Julien;
Sociedad Filosófica Ibero Americana XXth meeting Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung Comment on Juan Comesaña's “Can we believe for practical reasons?” 12.01.2015 Huatulco, Mexiko Dutant Julien;
Formal Epistemology Workgroup Einzelvortrag Safety and Inference 17.11.2014 University of Michigan, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika Dutant Julien;
The New Evil Demon Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung Knowledge-Based Decision Theory and the New Evil Demon. 12.09.2014 Université de Genève, Schweiz Dutant Julien;
Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung Is the Not-so-Evil Demon victim Gettiered 11.07.2014 University of Cambridge, Grossbritannien und Nordirland Dutant Julien;
John Broome on his recently published 'Rationality Through Reasoning' Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung Enkrasia and the semantics of "ought" 20.06.2014 Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgien Dutant Julien;
Workshop with Jessica Brown Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung Brown on epistemic propriety and submaximality 10.04.2014 Université de Genève, Schweiz Dutant Julien;
Philosophy Colloquium Einzelvortrag The Normative Sceptical Paradox 05.02.2014 University of York, Grossbritannien und Nordirland Dutant Julien;


Selber organisiert

Titel Datum Ort
The New Evil Demon 12.09.2013 Université de Genève, Schweiz

Abstract

What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. Commonplace at it seems, the idea is rejected by dominant theories of rationality. Decision theorists, bayesian philosophers of science and many ethicists hold that what is rational to do only depends on what we think we know or what we seem to know. Recent developments in epistemology are challenging these views. They explore new ways of integrating theories of knowledge and rationality. Their goal is to reconcile our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens commonly think about rational decision and belief. The present project is part of that movement. It will contribute to these developments by building on my past research in epistemology and expanding it towards the theory of rationality.
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