Knowledge; Rationality; Decision theory; Bayesianism; Belief; Reasons; Norms
(2014), Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel
(2014), The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge, 200-227.
(2013), In Defence of Swamping, in Thought
, 2(4), 357-366.
(2013), Is There a Statistical Solution to the Generality Problem?, in Erkenntnis
, 78(6), 1347-1365.
, The Legend of the Justified True Belief Analysis, in Philosophical Perspectives
The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, , The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality
, The Value and Normative Role of Knowledge, 200-227.
Truth and Epistemic Norms, , Truth and Epistemic Norms
What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. Commonplace at it seems, the idea is rejected by dominant theories of rationality. Decision theorists, bayesian philosophers of science and many ethicists hold that what is rational to do only depends on what we think we know or what we seem to know. Recent developments in epistemology are challenging these views. They explore new ways of integrating theories of knowledge and rationality. Their goal is to reconcile our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens commonly think about rational decision and belief. The present project is part of that movement. It will contribute to these developments by building on my past research in epistemology and expanding it towards the theory of rationality.