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Epistemic Emotions: Nature and Role

English title Epistemic Emotions: Nature and Role
Applicant Meylan Anne
Number 140404
Funding scheme Project funding (Div. I-III)
Research institution Philosophisches Seminar Universität Basel
Institution of higher education University of Basel - BS
Main discipline Philosophy
Start/End 01.06.2013 - 31.05.2016
Approved amount 319'896.00
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All Disciplines (2)

Discipline
Philosophy
Psychology

Keywords (6)

interest; inquiry; epistemic value; epistemic normativity; epistemic emotions; boredom

Lay Summary (French)

Lead
Les émotions épistémiques: leur nature et leur rôle
Lay summary

De nombreux phénomènes affectifs —l’étonnement, la curiosité, l’intérêt, la surprise, le sentiment de certitude, le doute, la crainte de l’inconnu, l'ennui— sont baptisés, dans la littérature philosophique ainsi qu’en psychologie, « émotions » ou « sentiments » épistémiques.

Le premier objectif de ce projet de recherche est de considérer précisément l’unité de cette catégorie. Y’a-t-il quelque chose de communément « épistémique » —en lien avec la recherche de la vérité— à tous ces phénomènes affectifs? Et peut-on parler d’émotions dans tous les cas, c’est-à-dire de phénomènes affectifs appartenant au même type que la peur, la jalousie, la joie? La curiosité n’est-elle pas plutôt un désir qu’une émotion ?

Le second but de ce projet est d’examiner quels rôles ces phénomènes affectifs jouent dans nos activités cognitives. Servent-ils simplement à nous motiver à connaître d’avantage? Nous donnent-ils également des raisons de croire ce que l’on croit ? Quel est l’intérêt de l’intérêt ?

Autant de questions qui se situent au carrefour de la philosophie des émotions et de l’épistémologie auxquelles nous tenterons de répondre en prenant appui sur la littérature existante en psychologie et dans les sciences cognitives.

Direct link to Lay Summary Last update: 23.04.2013

Responsible applicant and co-applicants

Employees

Name Institute

Publications

Publication
The Virtual Reality of the Invisible Hand
Tieffenbach Emma (2016), The Virtual Reality of the Invisible Hand, in Social Science Information, 55(1), 115-134.
Qu’est-ce que la justification ?
Meylan Anne (2015), Qu’est-ce que la justification ?, Vrin, Paris.
The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame
Meylan Anne (2015), The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame, in The Journal of Philosophical Research, 40, 189-203.
Une croyance nommée désir
Engel Pascal (2015), Une croyance nommée désir, in Klèsis, 31, 1-?.
Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind
Meylan Anne (2014), Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind, in Philosophical Inquiries, 2(1), 173-190.
La justification des croyances testimoniales 
Meylan Anne (2014), La justification des croyances testimoniales , in Chevalier J.-M. (ed.), 1-21.
Belief and the right kind of Reason
Engel Pascal (2013), Belief and the right kind of Reason, in Teorema , 22(3), 19-34.
Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap Credit
Meylan Anne (2013), Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap Credit, in Philosophical Papers, 40(3), 327-340.
In defense of Normativism about the Aim of belief
Engel Pascal (2013), In defense of Normativism about the Aim of belief, in T. Chan (ed.), 32-63.
Is Epistemic Agency Possible
Philosophical Issues (2013), Is Epistemic Agency Possible, in Epistemic Agency, 23, 158-178.
Sosa on the Normativity of Belief
Engel Pasca (2013), Sosa on the Normativity of Belief, in Philosophical Studies, 617-624.
The Value Problem of Knowledge: an Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit Solution
Meylan Anne (2013), The Value Problem of Knowledge: an Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit Solution, in Res Philosophica, 90(2), 261-275.
L’intéressant
Meylan Anne, L’intéressant, in Deonna Julien (ed.).
L'envie/Envy
Cova Florian, Tieffenbach Emma, L'envie/Envy, in Sander David (ed.).
L'utilité
Tieffenbach Emma, L'utilité, in Deonna Julien (ed.).
The Normativity of Ordinary Justification
Meylan Anne, The Normativity of Ordinary Justification, in Carter A. (ed.).
Trades and incommensurability
Eyal Nir, Tieffenbach Emma, Trades and incommensurability, in The Monist, 99(4).

Collaboration

Group / person Country
Types of collaboration
Thumos, Genève Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
- Research Infrastructure
PERFECT (ESF Consolidator Project) Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Universität Basel, Philosophisches Seminar Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Université de Fribourg, Département de philosophie Switzerland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Christopher Hookway, University of Sheffield Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results
Tim Bayne, Oxford University Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Europe)
- in-depth/constructive exchanges on approaches, methods or results

Scientific events

Active participation

Title Type of contribution Title of article or contribution Date Place Persons involved
Perspectives On Deontology from Early Phenomenology and Contemporary Philosophy Talk given at a conference The Normativity of Exchange: Price Tags as Conditional Promises 06.07.2016 Genève, Switzerland Tieffenbach Emma;
Social Complexes 2 Talk given at a conference The nature of Exchanges 08.06.2016 Gothenburg, Sweden Tieffenbach Emma;
Atelier dans le cadre du CR public de Kevin Mulligan DE L’EMPIRE BELGE, DU DROIT-DE-L’HOMMISME ET DES LETTRES Talk given at a conference Les Mains Invisibles 22.04.2016 Genève, Switzerland Tieffenbach Emma;
Atelier Institut de bioéthique Genève Individual talk L'incommensurabilité et l'échange 07.03.2016 Genève, Switzerland Tieffenbach Emma;
Behavioral Insight Meeting Talk given at a conference Emotions and Nudges 08.02.2016 Genève, Switzerland Tieffenbach Emma;
Colloquium seminar serie Individual talk Response-dependency, Money and the Invisible Hand 10.11.2015 Basel, Switzerland Tieffenbach Emma;
Gecopol Individual talk La nature de l'échange 07.10.2015 Genève, Switzerland Tieffenbach Emma;
Conférence de laSOPHA Talk given at a conference La normativité de la justification 17.06.2015 Montréal, Canada Meylan Anne;
Epistemic and Practical Normativity: Meta-Normative Problems and Proposals Talk given at a conference Reasons-Responsiveness and the Basing Relation 12.06.2015 Southampton, Great Britain and Northern Ireland Meylan Anne;


Self-organised

Title Date Place
Beliefs that Feel Good (Workshops) 16.12.2015 Bâle, Switzerland
Epistemic Emotions and Feelings 25.08.2014 Genève, Switzerland

Communication with the public

Communication Title Media Place Year
Media relations: radio, television Boursicoter ou troquer ? Il faut choisir Radio Suisse Romande Western Switzerland 2015

Associated projects

Number Title Start Funding scheme
116032 Connaissance, Raison et Normes 01.04.2007 Project funding (Div. I-III)
157436 Irrationality 01.09.2015 SNSF Professorships
144403 Analyses de la rationalité en termes de connaissance 01.10.2012 Project funding (Div. I-III)

Abstract

Various affective phenomena -e.g. intellectual courage, astonishment, curiosity, interest, wonder, surprise, the feeling of certainty, the feeling of doubt, the fear of the unknown, misology (i.e. the hate of the reasoning), the joy of verification, the feeling of knowing- have been labelled “epistemic emotions or feelings”. Two main questions deserve to be asked about epistemic emotions: first what are they? Second, which role do they play in epistemic activities, such as deliberation, beliefs’ revision and inquiry. The project is, accordingly, divided into main parts that are further subdivided into four research modules.The first part is dedicated to investigating the affective (module 1) and the epistemic (module 2) nature of the so-called “epistemic emotions” and “epistemic feelings”.The second part looks at the causal (module 3) and justificatory (module 4) roles that the formerly delineated epistemic emotions could play in our epistemic activities.The intended research would rely on studies into particular epistemic emotions or feelings already carried out by psychologists and cognitive scientists and by philosophers writing on emotions in general.
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