interest; inquiry; epistemic value; epistemic normativity; epistemic emotions; boredom
Tieffenbach Emma (2016), The Virtual Reality of the Invisible Hand, in Social Science Information
, 55(1), 115-134.
Meylan Anne (2015), Qu’est-ce que la justification ?
, Vrin, Paris.
Meylan Anne (2015), The Legitimacy of Intellectual Praise and Blame, in The Journal of Philosophical Research
, 40, 189-203.
Engel Pascal (2015), Une croyance nommée désir, in Klèsis
, 31, 1-?.
Meylan Anne (2014), Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind, in Philosophical Inquiries
, 2(1), 173-190.
Meylan Anne (2014), La justification des croyances testimoniales , in Chevalier J.-M. (ed.), 1-21.
Engel Pascal (2013), Belief and the right kind of Reason, in Teorema
, 22(3), 19-34.
Meylan Anne (2013), Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of Cheap Credit, in Philosophical Papers
, 40(3), 327-340.
Engel Pascal (2013), In defense of Normativism about the Aim of belief, in T. Chan (ed.), 32-63.
Philosophical Issues (2013), Is Epistemic Agency Possible, in Epistemic Agency
, 23, 158-178.
Engel Pasca (2013), Sosa on the Normativity of Belief, in Philosophical Studies
Meylan Anne (2013), The Value Problem of Knowledge: an Axiological Diagnosis of the Credit Solution, in Res Philosophica
, 90(2), 261-275.
Meylan Anne, L’intéressant, in Deonna Julien (ed.).
Cova Florian, Tieffenbach Emma, L'envie/Envy, in Sander David (ed.).
Tieffenbach Emma, L'utilité, in Deonna Julien (ed.).
Meylan Anne, The Normativity of Ordinary Justification, in Carter A. (ed.).
Eyal Nir, Tieffenbach Emma, Trades and incommensurability, in The Monist
Various affective phenomena -e.g. intellectual courage, astonishment, curiosity, interest, wonder, surprise, the feeling of certainty, the feeling of doubt, the fear of the unknown, misology (i.e. the hate of the reasoning), the joy of verification, the feeling of knowing- have been labelled “epistemic emotions or feelings”. Two main questions deserve to be asked about epistemic emotions: first what are they? Second, which role do they play in epistemic activities, such as deliberation, beliefs’ revision and inquiry. The project is, accordingly, divided into main parts that are further subdivided into four research modules.The first part is dedicated to investigating the affective (module 1) and the epistemic (module 2) nature of the so-called “epistemic emotions” and “epistemic feelings”.The second part looks at the causal (module 3) and justificatory (module 4) roles that the formerly delineated epistemic emotions could play in our epistemic activities.The intended research would rely on studies into particular epistemic emotions or feelings already carried out by psychologists and cognitive scientists and by philosophers writing on emotions in general.