imagination; memory; perception; modes; mental content; epistemology; attitudes; philosophy of mind; emotions
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2017), Getting Bodily Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way’, in Emotion Review
, 9(1), 55-63.
Teroni Fabrice (2017), In Pursuit of Emotional Modes: The Philosophy of Emotion after James’., in Cohen Alix, Stern Robert (ed.), Oxford University Press, New York, 291-310.
Teroni Fabrice (2017), The Phenomenology of Memory, in Michaelian Kourken, Bernecker Sven (ed.), 21-33.
Teroni Fabrice (2016), Emotions et moi, et moi, et moi, in Revue philosophie de la France et de l'étranger
, 141, 161-178.
Teroni Fabrice (2016), Emotions, Me, Myself and I, in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
, 24(4), 433-451.
Cova Florian, Teroni Fabrice (2016), Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?, in Philosophical Psychology
, 29(6), 930-942.
Deonna Julien A, Teroni Fabrice (2015), Emotions as Attitudes, in Dialectica
, 69(3), 293-311.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien, Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory, in Kriegel Uriah (ed.).
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien, Emotions and Evaluative Knowledge, in Scarantino Andrea (ed.).
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien, Les attitudes appropriées verbatim, in Les ateliers de l'éthique
Konzelmann Ziv Anita, Tappolet Christine, Teroni Fabrice (ed.), Shadows of the Soul - Philosophical Perspectives on Negative Emotions
Naar Hichem, Teroni Fabrice (ed.), The Ontology of Emotions
We intuitively describe mental reality with the help of a fundamental contrast between what philosophers call psychological modes, on the one hand, and their contents, on the other hand. Amongst psychological modes, we count seeing, hearing, remembering, thinking, imagining, wondering and the like and, amongst contents, any kind of propositional (e.g., that a red tree is in front of one) or sub-propositional (one’s first meeting with a good friend, a melody) complement that these verbs can take. One can then be quite naturally led to think that a major task facing philosophers interested in mental states consists in exploring the nature of modes and their relations to contents. However, even though a vast majority of philosophers acknowledge the distinction, their interest in modes vanishes once they have done so. This neglect had and continues to have some regrettable consequences. It has for instance led many philosophers to endorse the idea that all psychological modes can be assimilated to belief and desire, or to uninteresting variations on them. Another consequence, also traceable to the influence of functionalism and representationalism, is that it has contributed to reinforce the conviction that all issues regarding phenomenology have to be addressed either in terms of content, or in terms of unintentional properties or qualia. The original idea behind the present research project is that confronting the source of these consequences head-on - that is to say, systematically investigating the nature of psychological modes as well as their contributions to intentionality and phenomenology - is needed if we are to develop a convincing account of the nature of mental states and to shed new light on some philosophical problems surrounding these aspects of the mind. Its aim is thus to explore the relevance and import of the distinction between mode and content in general as well as in relation to a variety of types of mental states such as perceptions, sensations, emotions, memories and imaginings. Given the nature of these issues, it will provide a unique opportunity to make arguments and theses in a variety of philosophical domains (philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of language) interact. To my knowledge, this is the first attempt within recent philosophy to systematically investigate the mode-content distinction and to engage with a variety of debates that start to emerge in different philosophical domains.