Epistemic value, Belief, Decision theory, Knowledge, Rationality, Reasons, Action, Normativity, Rational choice theory, Bayesianism
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Volontà, credenza e verità, Jouvence, Milano.
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Engel Pascal (2014), La philosophie comme science morale des raisons et des normes, in
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Engel Pascal (2015), Interprétation, raison et faits, in
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Engel Pascal (2014), L’avenir du crétinisme, in Reboul Anne (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2013), Alethic Fonctionalism and the Norm of Belief, in Pedersen Nikolaj (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2013), Davidson and contemporary Philosophy, in Lepore Ernest (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2013), In defense of Normativism about the Aim of belief, in Chan Timothy (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2013), Les theories contemporaines de la signification, in Kévorkian Gilles (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2014), La raison et ses domaines, in Tiercelin Claudine (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2014), Fausses sciences, esprits faux, in Rasplus Valéry (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2015), Is Identity a Functional Property?, in Frauchiger Michael (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2014), The Norm of truth: a dialogue, in Fabio Bacchini (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2015), Escepticismo cartesiano y escepticismo humeano, in Ornelas Jorge (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2015), Can Deflationism Account for the Norm of Truth?, in Achourioti Theodora (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2015), Against Alethic Pluralism, in Lecis Pier Luigi (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2015), Rambling on the Value of Truth, in Persson Johannes (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (2015), Une croyance nommée désir, in Schmitt Yann (ed.),
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Engel Pascal (ed.) (2015),
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Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2012),
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Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2015), Emotions as Attitudes, in
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Teroni Fabrice, Tappolet Christine, Deonna Julien (2015), Emotions: Philosophical Issues About, in
WIREs Cognitive Science, 6(3), 193-208.
Teroni Fabrice, Allpress Jesse, Brown Rupert, Giner - Sorolla Roger, Deonna Julien (2014), Two Faces of group-based Shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame Differently Predict Positive and Negative Responses to Ingroup Wrongdoing, in
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(10), 1270-1284.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2013), What Role for Emotions in Well-Being?, in
Philosophical Topics, 41(1), 123-142.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2015), Emotions and Values, in Brosch Tobias (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice (2014), Emotions et connaissance, in Chevalier Jean-Marie (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2015), In What Sense are Emotions Evaluations?, in Roeser Sabine (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice (2014), Le plaisir de manger du chocolat, in Massin Olivier (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice (2014), Fictions, émotions et araignées au plafond, in Dutant Julien (ed.),
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Fassio Davide (2015), Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right, in
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Fassio Davide (accepted), Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance, in Chevalier Jean-Marie (ed.),
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Fassio Davide (accepted), Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards, in Grajner Martin (ed.),
Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, De Gruyter, Berlin, xx-xx.
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Teroni Fabrice (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (accepted), The Phenomenology of Memory, in Bernecker Sven (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice (accepted), In Pursuit of Emotional Modes: The Philosophy of Emotion After James, in Cohen Alix (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice (accepted), L’honneur, in Deonna Julien (ed.),
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Teroni Fabrice, Cova Florian (accepted), Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?, in
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Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (accepted), Putting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way, in
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Teroni Fabrice (accepted), Emotions et moi, et moi, et moi, in
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What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. That is the way many decision makers, scientific experts and ordinary citizens think: for instance, if we do not know whether a drug is safe enough, we should not market it. The idea is rejected, however, by dominant theories of rationality. Standard decision theory, bayesian accounts of scientific rationality and many ethical theories hold that rational choice and rational theory acceptance depend on what we believe or experience rather than what we know. Recent developments in epistemology have challenged these views. The project builds on them to develop a full-blown account of rationality in terms of knowledge. It aims at reconciling our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens ordinarily think about rational decision and belief.