Epistemic value; Belief; Decision theory; Knowledge; Rationality; Reasons; Action; Normativity; Rational choice theory; Bayesianism
Fassio Davide (2015), A Blind-spot Argument against Dispositionalist Accounts of Belief, in
Acta Analytica, 29(1), 71-81.
Engel Pascal (2015), Against Alethic Pluralism, in Lecis Pier Luigi (ed.), Franco Angeli, Milano, 249-266.
Engel Pascal (2015), Can Deflationism Account for the Norm of Truth?, in Achourioti Theodora (ed.), Springer, Dordrecht, 245-260.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2015), Emotions and Values, in Brosch Tobias (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 155-173.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2015), Emotions as Attitudes, in
Dialectica, 69(3), 293-311.
Teroni Fabrice, Tappolet Christine, Deonna Julien (2015), Emotions: Philosophical Issues About, in
WIREs Cognitive Science, 6(3), 193-208.
Engel Pascal (2015), Escepticismo cartesiano y escepticismo humeano, in Ornelas Jorge (ed.), Geida Editorial, Mexico, 241-265.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2015), In What Sense are Emotions Evaluations?, in Roeser Sabine (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 15-31.
Engel Pascal (2015), Interprétation, raison et faits, in
Critique, 502-517.
Engel Pascal (2015), Is Identity a Functional Property?, in Frauchiger Michael (ed.), De Gruyter, Berlin, Boston, Peking, 75-94.
Fassio Davide (2015), Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right, in
Logos & Episteme, 6(3), 265-289.
Engel Pascal (2015), Le réalisme kitsch, in
Cahier Zilsel, xx-xx.
Engel Pascal (ed.) (2015),
Littérature et connaissance. Philosophiques, vol. 40 no. 1, Erudit, Paris.
Engel Pascal (2015), Peut-il y avoir de savoirs collectifs?, in
Cahiers philosophiques, 142(3), 93-106.
Engel Pascal (2015), Rambling on the Value of Truth, in Persson Johannes (ed.), Media-Tryck, Lund, 51-73.
Fassio Davide, McKenna Robin (2015), Revisionary Epistemology, in
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 58(7-9), 755-779.
Fassio Davide (2015), The Aim of Belief, in
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, xx-xx.
Engel Pascal (2015), Une croyance nommée désir, in Schmitt Yann (ed.), Kleis, Paris, 4-18.
Engel Pascal (2015), Une réponse à Ponce Pilate, in
Philosophie, 125, 81-91.
Teroni Fabrice (2014), Emotions et connaissance, in Chevalier Jean-Marie (ed.), Ithaque, Paris, 9-34.
Engel Pascal (2014), Fausses sciences, esprits faux, in Rasplus Valéry (ed.), Éditions Matériologiques, Paris, 29-54.
Teroni Fabrice (2014), Fictions, émotions et araignées au plafond, in Dutant Julien (ed.), University of Geneva, Geneva, 112-128.
Fassio Davide (2014), Il fine della credenza, in
Aphex, 9, xx-xx.
Vollet Jacques-Henri (2014), Knowledge Attribution, Warranted Assertability Manoeuvre and the Maxim of Relation, in Dutant Julien (ed.), University of Geneva, Geneva, 481-505.
Engel Pascal (2014), L’avenir du crétinisme, in Reboul Anne (ed.), Springer-Verlag, New York, 135-148.
Engel Pascal (2014), La philosophie comme science morale des raisons et des normes, in
Académie des sciences morales et politiques, 2014, xx-xx.
Engel Pascal (2014), La raison et ses domaines, in Tiercelin Claudine (ed.), Collège de France, Paris, 1-37.
Teroni Fabrice (2014), Le plaisir de manger du chocolat, in Massin Olivier (ed.), Ithaque, Paris, 91-96.
Engel Pascal (2014), Les Moocs: des drones pour l'université?, in
Le débat, 180, 179-185.
Fassio Davide (ed.) (2014),
Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel, University of Geneva, Geneva.
Engel Pascal (2014), Malebranche est-il un adverbialiste?, in
Séminaire Descartes, 1-11.
Fassio Davide (2014), Taking Norm-Regulation Seriously, in Dutant Julien (ed.), University of Geneva, Geneva, 760-777.
Engel Pascal (2014), The Norm of truth: a dialogue, in Fabio Bacchini (ed.), Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, 1-14.
Fassio Davide (2014), Truth and the Aim of Belief, in
Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy, xx-xx.
Teroni Fabrice, Allpress Jesse, Brown Rupert, Giner - Sorolla Roger, Deonna Julien (2014), Two Faces of group-based Shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame Differently Predict Positive and Negative Responses to Ingroup Wrongdoing, in
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(10), 1270-1284.
Engel Pascal (2014),
Volontà, credenza e verità, Jouvence, Milano.
Engel Pascal (2014), Y a-t-il eu vraiment une rencontre entre Ricœur et la philosophie analytique?, in
Etudes Ricoeuriennes, 5(1), 125-141.
Engel Pascal (2013), “Trois conceptions de la connaissance littéraire”, in
Philosophiques, 40(1), xx-xx.
Engel Pascal (2013), Alethic Fonctionalism and the Norm of Belief, in Pedersen Nikolaj (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 69-87.
Engel Pascal (2013), Belief and the right kind of Reason, in
Teorema, XXII(3), 19-34.
Engel Pascal (2013), Davidson and contemporary Philosophy, in Lepore Ernest (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 588-604.
Engel Pascal (2013), Doxastic Correctness, in
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 87, 199-216.
Fassio Davide (2013), How to Distinguish Norms from Values, in Forlè Francesca (ed.), IUSS Press, Pavia, 148-158.
Fassio Davide (2013), Il Paradosso della Conoscibilità, in
Aphex, 7, xx-xx.
Engel Pascal (2013), In defense of Normativism about the Aim of belief, in Chan Timothy (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 32-63.
Engel Pascal (2013), Is Epistemic Agency Possible?, in
Philosophical Issues, 23, Epistemic Agency, 157-178.
Teroni Fabrice (ed.) (2013),
Le ombre dell’anima, Cortina Editore, Milano.
Engel Pascal (2013), Les theories contemporaines de la signification, in Kévorkian Gilles (ed.), Vrin, Paris, 75-182.
Engel Pascal (2013), Sosa on the Normativity of Belief, in
Philosophical Studies, 166(3), 617-624.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2013), What Role for Emotions in Well-Being?, in
Philosophical Topics, 41(1), 123-142.
Engel Pascal (2012), Rinnovare il Palazzo della Ragione, in
Rivista di Filosofia, 3 , 393-408.
Engel Pascal (2012), Bad analytic philosophy, in
dialectica, 1, 1-4.
Engel Pascal (2012), Le droit de ne pas croire, in
ThéoRèmes, 2, xx-xx.
Engel Pascal (2012),
Les lois de l’esprit, Ithaque, Paris.
Teroni Fabrice (2012), Review of Memory: A Philosophical Study, by Sven Bernecker, in
The Philosophical Quarterly, 62(248), 626-628.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien (2012),
The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge, New York.
Engel Pascal (2012), Trust and the Doxastic Family, in
Philosophical Studies, 161 (1), 17-26.
Fassio Davide, Commonality Reconsidered: On the Common Source of Epistemic Standards, in Grajner Martin (ed.), De Gruyter, Berlin, xx-xx.
Vollet Jacques-Henri, Connaissance, expertise et fiabilité : réponse à P. Willaime, in Chevalier Jean-Marie (ed.), Collège de France, Paris, xx-xx.
Teroni Fabrice, Emotions et moi, et moi, et moi, in
Revue Philosophique de France et de l’Etranger, xx-xx.
Teroni Fabrice, In Pursuit of Emotional Modes: The Philosophy of Emotion After James, in Cohen Alix (ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, xx-xx.
Teroni Fabrice, Cova Florian, Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?, in
Philosophical Psychology, xx-xx.
Teroni Fabrice, L’honneur, in Deonna Julien (ed.), Ithaque, Paris, xx-xx.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien, Putting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way, in
Emotion Review, xx-xx.
Vollet Jacques-Henri, Raisons, in
L'Encyclopédie Philosophique, xx-xx.
Vollet Jacques-Henri, Rationalité, réflexion, action, in Chevalier Jean-Marie (ed.), Collège de France, Paris, xx-xx.
Fassio Davide (ed.),
Synthese Special Issue: Truth and Epistemic Norms, x, x.
Teroni Fabrice (ed.),
The Ontology of Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Teroni Fabrice, Deonna Julien, The Phenomenology of Memory, in Bernecker Sven (ed.), Routledge, New York, xx-xx.
Fassio Davide, Une explication instrumentale de la relation entre assertion et connaissance, in Chevalier Jean-Marie (ed.), Collège de France, Paris, xx-xx.
What we ought to do and what we ought to believe depends on what we know. That is the way many decision makers, scientific experts and ordinary citizens think: for instance, if we do not know whether a drug is safe enough, we should not market it. The idea is rejected, however, by dominant theories of rationality. Standard decision theory, bayesian accounts of scientific rationality and many ethical theories hold that rational choice and rational theory acceptance depend on what we believe or experience rather than what we know. Recent developments in epistemology have challenged these views. The project builds on them to develop a full-blown account of rationality in terms of knowledge. It aims at reconciling our fundamental theories of rationality with the way scientific experts, decision makers and citizens ordinarily think about rational decision and belief.