Projekt

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Partial Fiscal Decentralization

Titel Englisch Partial Fiscal Decentralization
Gesuchsteller/in Jametti Mario
Nummer 130443
Förderungsinstrument ProDoc (Forschungsmodul, FM)
Forschungseinrichtung Instituto MecoP Università della Svizzera italiana
Hochschule Università della Svizzera italiana - USI
Hauptdisziplin Volkswirtschaftslehre
Beginn/Ende 01.10.2010 - 30.09.2013
Bewilligter Betrag 162'594.00
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Keywords (4)

fiscal federalism, decentralization, political economy, Switzerland

Lay Summary (Englisch)

Lead
Lay summary
Much of the literature in Fiscal Federalism treats the allocation of spending duties among different levels of government as a binary choice (centralization vs. decentralization). The Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972) stipulates the conditions under which a specific public service should be provided by national or sub-national governments. However, joint provision of public goods and services is the norm in real-world federations such as Switzerland. Shared responsibility in the provision of public goods gives raise to two important consequences: informational problems and vertical interactions. This project aims at advancing research, both theoretical and empirical in the highly policy relevant forum of shared responsibility using the institutional variation of Switzerland. The questions we aim to answer are: What are the determinants of fiscal decentralization? What is the interplay between horizontal and vertical interactions between governments in public good provision? How should decentralization be measured?
Direktlink auf Lay Summary Letzte Aktualisierung: 21.02.2013

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Wissenschaftliche Veranstaltungen

Aktiver Beitrag

Titel Art des Beitrags Titel des Artikels oder Beitrages Datum Ort Beteiligte Personen
International Institute of Public Finance Annual Conference Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 22.08.2013 Taormina, Italien Jametti Mario
Canadian Economic Association Conference Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 31.05.2013 Montréal, Kanada Galletta Sergio
CESifo Public Sector Economics Conference Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 11.04.2013 Munich, Deutschland Jametti Mario
European Public Choice Society Conference Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 04.04.2013 Zürich, Schweiz Jametti Mario
Public Choice Society Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 08.03.2013 New Orleans, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika Galletta Sergio
CESifo Workshop on Political Economy Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 08.12.2012 Dresden, Deutschland Jametti Mario
XXIV Conferenza della Società italiana di Economia Pubblica Vortrag im Rahmen einer Tagung 24.09.2012 Pavia, Italien Galletta Sergio


Verbundene Projekte

Nummer Titel Start Förderungsinstrument
147668 The Swiss Confederation: A Natural Laboratory for Research on Fiscal and Political Decentralization 01.01.2014 Sinergia
119453 Administration publique 01.10.2008 ProDoc (Ausbildungsmodul, AM)

Abstract

Much of the literature in Fiscal Federalism treats the allocation of spending duties among different levels of government as a binary choice (centralization vs. decentralization). The Decentralization Theorem (Oates, 1972) stipulates the conditions under which a specific public service should be provided by national or sub-national governments. However, joint provision of public goods and services is the norm in real-world federations such as Switzerland. Shared responsibility in the provision of public goods gives raise to two important consequences: informational problems and vertical interactions. This project aims at advancing research, both theoretical and empirical in the highly policy relevant forum of shared responsibility using the institutional variation of Switzerland. The questions we aim to answer are: What are the determinants of fiscal decentralization? What is the interplay between horizontal and vertical interactions between governments in public good provision? How should decentralization be measured?