Intentionality; Philosophy of mind; Metaphysics; Content; Perspective; Facts; Propositions; Formal objects
Acceptance, Acknowledgment, Affirmation, Agreement, Assertion, Belief, Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal & Rejection
Mulligan K (2013), Acceptance, Acknowledgment, Affirmation, Agreement, Assertion, Belief, Certainty, Conviction, Denial, Judgment, Refusal & Rejection, in Textor M (ed.), Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 97.
Boccardi E (2013), Are Colors Real?, in Kairos, Journal of Philosophy & Science
Correia F & Iacona A (ed.) (2013), Around the Tree. Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future
, Springer, Dordrecht.
Baldwin B T (Mulligan K) (2013), Egos and Selves – from Husserl to Nagel, in C. Svennerlind J. Almäng R. Ingthorsson (ed.), 53.
Deng N (2013), Fine’s McTaggart, Temporal Passage, and the A versus B-debate’, in Ratio
Boccardi E (2013), Genuine Becoming and the Barcan Formula, in Kairos, Journal of Philosophy & Science
Gerrans Ph Mulligan K (2013), Immaginazione, default thinking e incorporamento, in D. Tagliafico (ed.), 1.
Deonna J (2013), Les animaux ont-ils des émotions ?, in Hügli Anton Horn Anita & al. (ed.), Schwabe, Basel, 1.
Correia F (2013), Metaphysical Grounds and Essence, in M. Hoeltje B. Schnieder and A. Steinberg (ed.), Philosophia, Munich, 271.
Deng N (2013), On explaining why time seems to pass, in Southern Journal of Philosophy
Deng N (2013), Our experience of passage on the B-theory, in Erkenntnis
Correia F (2013), Presentism and Non-Proxy Reductions of Eternalist Discourse, in Correia F & Iacona A (ed.), Springer, Dordrecht, 143.
Jaquet F & Cova F (2012), Conséquentialisme, Déontologisme et Ethique des Vertus, in Journet N (ed.), Sciences Humaines Editions, Auxerre, 73.
Mulligan K. & Scherer K. R. (2012), Definitions Come in Many Kinds: Reply to Comments, in Emotion Review
Soldati G. (2012), Direct Realism and Immediate Justification, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Hastings J. Ceusters W. Smith B.& Mulligan K. (2012), Dispositions and processes in the emotion ontology, in Proceedings of ICBO 2012
Correia F. & Rosenkranz S. (2012), Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Deonna J. & Teroni F. (2012), From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements, in Dialogue
Correia F. & Schnieder B. (2012), Grounding: An Opinionated Introduction, in Correia F. & Schnieder B. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK), 1.
Angelone L. & Tagliafico D. (2012), La mente. Ovvero della natura dei soggetti, in Andina T. (ed.), 187.
Correia F. & Schnieder B. (ed.) (2012), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality
, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (UK).
Jaquet F & Cova F (2012), Qu'est-ce que l'utilitarisme, in Journet N (ed.), Sciences Humaines Editions, Auxerre, 76.
Deng N (2012), Questions about ‘Internal and External Questions about God’, in Religious Studies
Deonna J. & Teroni F. (2012), The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction
, Routledge, New York.
Boccardi E. (2012), The Universe as an Ongoing Enterprise. Commentary on The Metaphysics Within Physics by Tim Maudlin, in Humana.Mente, Journal of Philosophical Studies
Mulligan K. & Scherer K. (2012), Toward a Working Definition of Emotion, in Emotion Review
Hastings J. Novère N. le Ceusters W. Mulligan K. Smith B. (2012), Wanting what we don’t want to want: Representing addiction in interoperable bio-ontologies, in Proceedings of ICBO 2012
Mulligan K (2012), Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande
, Vrin, Paris.
Mulligan Kevin (2012), Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande
, Vrin, Paris.
Correia F & Rosenkranz S (2011), As Time Goes By: Eternal Facts in an Ageing Universe
Soldati G. (2011), Epistemology, in Luft S. & Overgaard S. (ed.), Routledge, Oxford, 35.
Deonna J. (2011), Etre ému, in Tappolet C. Teroni F. & Konzelmann Ziv A. (ed.), 21.
Correia F (2011), From Grounding to Truth-Making: Some Thoughts, in Reboul A (ed.), 1.
Deonna J. Rodogno R. & Teroni F. (2011), In Defense of Shame
, Oxford University Press, New York.
Tappolet C. Teroni F. & Konzelmann Ziv A. (2011), Introduction, in Tappolet C. Teroni F. & Konzelmann Ziv A. (ed.), 11.
F. Teroni C. Tappolet & A. Konzelmann Ziv (2011), Introduction, in F. Teroni C. Tappolet & A. Konzelmann Ziv (ed.), 11.
Tappolet C. Teroni F. & Konzelmann Ziv A. (ed.) (2011), Les ombres de l’âme: Penser les émotions négatives
Mulligan Kevin (2011), On Meaning Something and Meanings, in Grazer Philosophische Studien
Soldati G. (2011), Philosophy and its History. Elements of Methodology, in Casasus G. & Haupt S. (ed.), LIT Verlag, Wien / Berlin, 83.
Teroni F. (2011), Plus ou moins: Emotions et valence, in Tappolet C. Teroni F. & Konzelmann Ziv A. (ed.), 21.
Bruun O. & Teroni F. (2011), Shame, Guilt and Morality, in Journal of Moral Philosophy
Deonna J. & Nanay B. (2011), Simulation vs. Theory-Theory: Plea for an Epistemological Turn, in Reboul A. (ed.), 1.
Mulligan Kevin (2011), Wittgenstein et ses prédecesseurs austro-allemands, in Philosophiques
Soldati G (2010), Die Rolle der Wahrnehmung in demonstrativen Gedanken, in Frank Manfred Wiedman Niels (ed.), Suhrkamp, Frankfurt , 112.
Mulligan K (2010), Emotions and Values, in Goldie P (ed.), OUP, Oxford, 475.
Correia F (2010), Grounding and Truth-Functions, in Logique et Analyse
Deonna J & Scherer K (2010), The Intentional Object Disappearing Act: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion, in Emotion Review
Mulligan K (2010), The Truth Connective vs the Truth Predicate. On Taking Connectives Seriously, in Dialectica
Mulligan K (2009), Gestalt (and feeling), in Sander D. & Scherer K (ed.), OUP, Oxford, 195.
Mulligan K (2009), Husserls Herz, in Manfred Frank & Niels Weidtmann (ed.), Suhrkamp, Berlin, 209.
Mulligan K (2009), Moral Emotions, in Sander D. & Scherer K. (ed.), OUP, Oxford, 262.
Mulligan K (2009), On Being Struck by Value – Exclamations, Motivations and Vocations, in Barbara Merkel (ed.), Mentis, Paderborn, 141.
Mulligan K (2009), Values, in R. Poidevin P. Simons A. McGonigal & R. Cameron (ed.), Routledge, London, 401.
The present project investigates intentionality, the central phenomenon studied in the philosophy of mind, from a metaphysical perspective. The three subprojects, each involving a postdoc and a PhD student and led by senior investigators with a large experience in the field, focus on the notion of content, analysing it from three different, alternative, but complementary perspectives. The first subproject investigates the perspectival character of contents, seeking to give a metaphysical analysis of essentially tensed, located and egocentric contents in terms of tensed, located and egocentric facts in the world. Subproject B assesses the prospects of the thesis that the intentionality of the mental is entirely accounted for in terms of conceptual content, usually taken to be the hallmark of propositional thought. The third subproject reconceives the intentionality of emotional episodes, in terms of their formal objects and their valence, questioning the analogy with perception. Together, the three projects thus illustrate the three main approaches to content, trying to capture the relevant phenomena in terms of their worldly, propositional or formal-objectual correlates. To these three takes on content correspond three different ways of individuating mental phenomena, in terms of their genesis, their constitution and their adequacy conditions respectively.